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THE APPROACH TO WORLD GOVERNMENT THROUGH
THE TECHNIQUE OF THE WORLD CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
JOHN H. DAVENPORT*

Ever since the beginning of the Atomic Era when embryonic world
citizens and decaying nationalists alike were afforded convincing proof that
the World would be either One or None, there have been efforts in the
United States and elsewhere to make a peaceful and lawful transition to One
World rather than a violent transition to No World. While thvse efforts have
concerned education and publicity in the broadest sense, there have also been
proposals to effect the legal changes which would make world government
a reality. The four major lines of action which have been canvassed and are
being followed, none necessarily exclusive of the others are:
(1) Popular referenda and polls on the question of the desirability of
world government;
(2) Diplomatic negotiation by the President or his representatives to
establish world government by treaty agreement among nations;
(3) Amendment of the United States Constitution to provide for the
entry of the United States into a world federation;
(4) Election of delegates to a world constitutional convention by the
people of the United States.
It is the writer's view that the first approach, while useful for publicity
purposes, is futile from a legal standpoint; that the second is unconstitutional;
that the third is unnecessary; and that the fourth line of action is difficult.
The difficulties are of a practical nature only and are outweighed by the
prestige of this approach in the American tradition. It is believed that much
light can be shed on the solution of the practical problems involved in. this
fourth method by the rich and varied precedents in American experience
since 1775 or even earlier.
I NTRODUicTION

The idea of world government is not a new one. Ever since Alexander
the Great, men have dreamed of establishing government over the world as
they knew it. Even the idea of world federal government is not new. The
empires established by Alexander and Caesar were loose confederations which
did not attempt to disturb local customs and loyalties, though Hitler, latest
in the line of the Caesars, went far in destroying or degrading the cultural
*
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WORLD GOVERNMENT
diversity of the countries he conquered. Stalin, by contrast, realizes that world
conquerors must maintain large degrees of national autonomy, and should
he forget this important political truth, there is always a Tito or a General
Mao Tse-Tung to remind him.
What is new in the history of ideas is the notion of democratic federatiou
of the world. And in the realm of practical. application of ideas, it is only
as old as the United States Constitution, which begins significantly enough.
"We, the People, ... do ordain and establish this Constitution." This was,
it is true, only a small scale "world" federation-taking in only the New
World and not all of that-but it was a model for later federations. It was,
as Carl Van Doren has called it, "the Great Rehearsal' for world federation.
It established patterns and precedents, not to be religiously mimicked, but to
be used as suggestions for the political imagination, analogies, and as vicarious
experience.
If the Constitution of the United States was not as democratic in substance
or form as it might have been, at least it established firmly the idea of popular
sovereignty, leaving to later generations by interpretation and practice to
approach closer the democratic ideal. By contrast, the blueprint for world
federation advanced by Communist theory establishes a hierarchy of mankind
in which Communist Party members occupy the highest position and the
hated bourgeoisie the lowest. "All men are created equal," according to
Jefferson's deathless version of Locke in the Declaration of Independence.
This states a present fact and holds before us an ideal classless society toward
which to strive. But the classless society of the Communist is one which can
be achieved only by exterminating one of the classes and ruling the other for
an indefinite period of history. And until the day when the one is exterminated
completely and the other has learned to govern itself to the satisfaction of
its Party Rulers, the pattern of Communist society is a triplex one of elite
(members of the Party) masses or majority (the proletariat) and oppressed
minority (the bourgeoisie). Both distinctions are abhorrent to the idea of
democratic world federation. A democratic world federation could not stand
if it were based on a distinction between members of the elite and the masses
-the core of democratic doctrine is that all men have the same nature and
that virtue is not the monopoly of any elite, whether it be an elite of power, of
intellect, or of wealth. No more could a world federation be democratic if
the rights of all men, regardless of their economic status, were not resoected
and protected. The idea of democratic world federation is based the' czire
on these two fundamental assumptions: that one man is or can be as fit to
rule or as good as another, and that minorities must be protected in their
human rights no less than majorities.
At the same time it must be recognized in all candor that in no national
state today are these fundamental assumptions embodied p'-fectly in practice.
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In other words there is a gap between practice and ideal. Ifthe gap between
ideal and reality is-to be bridged in the creation of a world constitution and
a democratic world federation, therefore, we must make a third assumption.
This is that every extant national state must be left free to determine how the
question of ratification of a world constitution shall be decided,
according to its own constitution and political forms. In other words, while a
world constitution must be based explicitly on the assumption of the democratic equality of all men and must guarantee their human rights, its actual
entry into force must be conditioned on the existent political realities, which
nowhere approximate the ideals of the constitution.1 This necessity was recognized by the Founding Fathers of the United States Constitution when they
provided for its ratification by states whose constitutions and local customs
were so diverse as those of Massachusetts and South Carolina, or Rhode
Island and Maryland.
This article will not argue the desirability of a greater degree of world
law and order under a world federation. Rather, it will be assumed that this
is a generally recognized necessity, and addressed to the more practical and
productive question of ways and means of achieving this goal in time to prevent
a war which the atomic scientists and military technicians never tire of telling
us will be little short of catastrophic for the civilization of the world.2 That
this is a reasonable assumption to make might seem self-evident, but public
opinion polls from time to time give fresh indications of the deep emotional
conviction with which the ordinary citizen holds to the idea of world peace.
The same polls, however, show evidence of much confusion and doubt about
the means proposed to this end.3 It is therefore fair to assume that a more
realistic question than the desirability of world government is that of just
how such a government is to be established and what are to be its characteristics beyond those previously mentioned.
It is necessary therefore to add one more assumption to those already
mentioned, This is the assumption that the characteristics of any world
government which would be desirable must represent the will and reason of
1. COMMITrEE TO FRAME A WORLD CONSTITUTION DOCUMENT No. 4, CONSIDERATIONS
RELEVANT TO THE DEFINITION OF WORLD FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 6 (Chicago 1946)

(Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, microfilm ed. 1948), p. 22. Hereafter
cited as CFWC.
2. See DEXTER MASTERS AND KATHERINE WAY, ONE WORLD OR NONE (New York,

1946). Following the first shock, the last year has seen a new crop of books on the
subject, e.g., LAPP, MUST WE HIDE? (Boston, 1949) ; BLACKETr, FEAR, WAR AND THE
BOMB (N. Y., 1949); DAVID BRADLEY, No PLACE TO HIDE (Boston, 1948). A review

of Lapp appears in U. S. News, April 29, 1949, p. 11.

3. Fortune, March 1944, pp. 94, 98. When the question, "Do you think the United
Nations should be strengthened to make it a world government with power to control
the armed forces of all nations, including the United States?" was put to voters with
opinions on the question in Holland, Sweden and the U. S. A., Americans voted nearly
2 to 1, the Dutch more than 2 to 1, and the Swedes more than 3 to I in favor of the
proposal, according to a news release of the AMERICAN INSTITUTF oF PUBLIC OPINION
(Gallup), December 24, 1947.
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the people of the world as well as of the nations of the world. 4 It must represent all the people, rather than any one nation or any group of nations. World
government by conquest and imposition of a particular form on the vanquished
is hereby ruled out as a desirable means of establishing world peace. To put
the assumption in other words, what is sought is the establishment of world
government by democratic compromise rather than by the violent dictation
of any one nation or group of nations or of any ideological group. r
This article will be based on these assumptions therefore: that world
federation must be democratic in form and philosophy; that some practical
way must be found to establish the government over nations whose own
constitutions and political forms are not perfectly democratic in form and
philosophy; that it is unnecessary to discuss in detail the necessity and desirability of world federation; and that it must be established by the method
of peaceful persuasion and compromise rather than by violence and war.
There have been four general categories of activity in the United States
directed toward gaining the goal of world federation. These are (1) popular
referenda, both official and unofficial, on the question of the desirability of
world givernment; (2) popular and congressional pressure on the President to
initiate a call for a conference of the members of the United Nations to revise
the United Nations Charter; (3) requests by State Legislatures for a United
States Constitutional Convention to provide for amendments to the Federal
Constitution to enable the United States to enter into a world federation if,
as and when one is formed; (4) State legislation to provide for the election
of delegates to a world constitutional convention by the people of the United
States.
The first of these activities will be dealt with only summarily, for its
bearing on the subject of this paper is only indirect.
UNOFFICIAL AND OFFICIAL

REFERENDA ON

THE DESIRABILITY

OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

In November. 1946, 255 cities and towns in Massachusetts placed a
question on the ballot about the strengthening of the United Nations into a

world organization able to prevent war. Voting favorably on the proposal were
586,093 people as against 63,624, a ratio of nearly 10 to I]6 The total number
4. CFWC, p. 7 (microfilm ed.. p. 21).
5. Compare Communist International, Blueprint for World Conquest edited by W.
H. Chamberlin (Chicago. 1946), pp.- 119-120. For the Russian view on democratic
proposals for world government, however, see "Doctor Einstein's Mistaken Notions, an'
open letter from four Soviet Scientists." New Times (Moscow) November 26, 1947,
reprinted with "A Reply to the Soviet Scientists, by Albert Einstein," by the Emergency
Committee of Atomic Scientists, Inc., Princeton, New 'Jersey, 1948.
6. MAss. SEN. MEMORIAL No. 204 (January, 1947), "Resolutions providing for

request for amendments to the Charter of the United Nations resulting in a limited
world federal government."

AHAAMI

LA11,' QUARTER.ILY

of those expressing an opinion was 72 per cent of the total vote cast, an almost
unheard-of record of pai:ticipation in a referendum question.'
In November, 1948, a similar referendtun was lield in Connecticut, where
the final tally showed a ratio of 12 to I in favor of the proposal. Incomplete
returns, however, indicated that little more than 16 per ceit of those who
voted for candidates on the same I allot bothered to register an opinion on
the referendum question. This is higher than is tusual in a ballot referendum
in this democratic nation, 8
The question has beeu a favorite of the public opinion surveys, aid it
has been asked in a variety of ways. An Ehno R oper 1)oll in the fall of 1948
found 51 per cent who wanted to "nmke UN work" and an lLdditioial 24 per
cent who believed that "America should start now to organize a world government in which we would become a memher state." More intenive polling
questions and techniques might clarify still further the opinions of the American people.9 The almost unintelligille question put to the Connecticut voters
in their polling booths was. Question re recommendation providing for
strengthening of United Nations to prevent war, Yes or No?" This was a
drastic abbreviation of-but perhaps an improvement on-the official referendum question, which was: "Do you, as a sovereign citizen of Connecticut
and the United States of America, direct our representatives in the national
Congress to urge the President and the Congress to take the lead in calling
for amendments to the United Nations Charter. strengthening the United
Nations into a limited world federal government capable of enactin.", interpreting, and enforcing world laws to prevent war?" 10
Many members of Congress have publicly expressed the view that the
United Nations was too weak to perform necessary international tasks.
Representative Rayburn, remarking on the proposal that the United Nations
organization assume responsibility for aid to Greece and Turkey, observed
that "the United Nations is impotent to handle this matter. The United
Nations has not the money, it has not the, power, it has not the organization
to do the job" ; 1 and Representative Jenkins of Ohio asked, "Why is it that
the United Nations organization has not been called on to lend its good offices
in an effort to compose and resolve these differences?" 12 Senator Byrd of
Virginia concluded, "If the United Nations is not strong enough for the
task, then let us take steps to make it strong." iS Partly as a result of these
views, Congressmen were polled on the proposal to transform the UN into a
'

7. 6 World Government News, December, 1948, p. 9.
8, Loc. cit. A similar referendum held in Lauf, Germany, a little town near Niirn-

berg. produced from about half the voters a 97%. favorable vote, in November, 1948.
9. See Fortune, November, 1948, pp. 88-90.

10. 6 World Government News, November, 1948, p. 8.
11. 3 Co\x-c. Ryc. 4742 (May 7, 1947).
12. Op. cit. supra, at p. 4926 (May 9, 1947).
13. 93 CoNe,. Ric. 3778 (April 22, 1947).
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federal world government with powers adequate to keep peace and with
direct jurisdiction over individuals in the international sphere. The 81st
Congress has fifteen senators and 72 representatives who favor this proposal
and have pledged themselves to work for it." Similar quizzing of Congressmen
from Florida by Hamilton Holt of Rollins College brought affirmatives from
all except Representatives Rogers and Sikes.'
An impressive list of major-party state conventions, as well as several
minor parties' national conventions, went on record for world government
in the election year of 1948. These included the Republican conventions of
California, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina and Vermont,
and the Democratic conventions of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, Texas, Washington and Wyoming.
"Ultimate world government" planks were nailed to the national platforms
of the Socialist Party and the Progressive Party, but only the Prohibition
Party came out foursquare for world federation now.16
In addition to these more or less official records of the status of public
opinion, various local, state and national organizations have gone on record
at one time or another as favoring world government. These run the alphabet
from the American Legion (North Carolina Department) to the Zonta
Club of Dallas, Texas.
Implicit in all these activities is the conviction or belief that what the
ordinary citizen thinks is important, and that knowledge of the views of his
representatives in government is important to him in making up his mind
whether to vote for or against them. This sort of activity is based, in a word,
on the belief that popular support and information is necessary to the creation
of a democratic world republic. Such activities should not be decried as being
useless expressions of opinion. They supply the very necessary moral support
which any idea must have if it is to be acted upon. If it is certain that no
officially elected representative will act contrary to the expressed will of
his constituents, it is equally certain that he will not act at all if no expression
of their will is available to him, especially if it is concerned with a new and
uncharted problem. Referenda and public opinion polls have often been accused
of presenting to the voter technical issues which he was not equipped to
consider, either by interest or by intellect. This is probably true. If so, it is
14. Where They Stand, World Government News, October, 1948, p. 11, and ibid.
December, 1948, P. 4.
15. Letters in the files of the Institute of World Government, Rollins College, Winter
Park, Florida.
16. See World Government News, September, 1948, p. 13. The Communist Party
put forward no platform of its own, but instead supported the Progressive Party candidate
for the Presidency. At the same time, some' of its members fought in the platform
Drafting Committee to strike or water down the world government plank of the Progressive Party. This was in accord with the current "party line" of the Communists.
For insight into the difficulties of working with Communists, see Letter to Rexford G.
Tugwrell, 2 COMMON CAUSE 41, September, 1948, p. 41 and Open Reply to Mr. Borgese,
ibid. October, 1948, p. 81.
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all the more amazing that such a large percentage of voters have shown such
interest and fundamental understanding of the extraordinarily complicated
is.sues of world government problems. These expressions of opinion have no
direct effect on the establishment of world government, however. When all
has been said, nothing has been done. They are merely wishes, pious expressions of hope. They do not of themselves accomplish the ,task of erecting
a juridical structure for the world. One may speculate that the prevalence of
polls may even have a deadening effect on democratic government. By asking
the puhllic what it wants, the pollsters are emphasizing desires rather than
the techniques of fulfilling them. To what extent does the mere expression of
a desire alleviate the psychological tension of desiring? The enervating effect
of the daydream is too well known to folklore and to psychiatric science to
discuss here. To what extent does the public believe that mere expressions
of their desires will result in their fulfillment? It is too well known that legislators and presidents (and why not dictators ?) do not follow public opinion
so much as they ignore or mold it. Legislators are, after all, not so much
interested in what their constituents opine on the subject of world governnet as they are in how fanatically convinced are their constituents that'
nothi'g is more important. They are not interested in public opinion in vacuo
but in those opinions which will move people to go out and vote for or
against a candidate for office.
DiPLOMATIC REVrSION OF TIlE

UNITI.iD

NATIONS CHARTER

Article M) of the United Nations Charter reads as follows :'7

A General Conference of tile Members of the United Nations for the
puirpose of reviewing the present Charter may Ibe held at a date and l)lace
to ie fixed by a two-thirds vo te rif the members of theW (GCheral Assembly
ald bv a ote of any seven nileibers of the Security Coiicil....
.\nv alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds
vote of 'tile Conference slall take effect when ratilieid ill acerdalane with
their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of
41f the Security
et
The Unitel Nations. itictdiiig all the ljeriMane- nenl'rs
Council.

It slionld 1e i noted that any one-third-l1iS-one of the Menihers in the
General Assembly colihl Iock the calliig of this General Conference, and
that the agreement of all of the "Big Five" would le necessary to block it in
the Security Council. In other words, if tile mnen who altend the sessions of
the General Assembly anfd lhe Scenrity Council were free mo ral agents. it
would not he impossil he fir them to decide to call such a c iiference. It should
17.-U. S. lpl)artnicnt of StaLtt, (harier fif the Unitd NaliUs. together with, tihe
Statute of the Interinationl Cuor't of J11 lic., Juiiie 25, 1945, jlll). 2353 (.\\asthilgto , 1915),
pp. 34-35.
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also be noted, however, that any actual changes in the structure of the United
Nations organization must have the approval, not only of the Soviet Union,
but of the United States Senate-not only of the embattled Chinese Government, but of the French, too, and the British. Only if the treaty-makers of
all of these "big" powers acquiesce, can changes be made in the Charter of
the United Nations.
If this arrangement be criticized, it must be remembered that the "little"
nations' representatives at San Francisco, led by Herbert Evatt of Australia,
fought hard to get even the sop of the automatic revision conference thrown
to them.1 8
Proposals for revision of the United Nations Charter have come from
several sources. Perhaps the earliest proposal in point of time came from the
Dublin, New Hampshire, Conference, October 11-16, 1945, a few months
after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. The idea for this conference
had originated even earlier. When it became clear that the Dumbarton Oaks
proposals were to be taken over practically intact by the United Nations
Conference on International Organization a; San Francisco, Justice Owen
J. Roberts, Clarence Streit, author of Union Now, and Grenville Clark, New
York lawyer who had drafted the Selective Service Law of 1940 and subsequent amendments, called a conference of leaders in politics, law and education to meet at Dublin, New Hampshire, to discuss the possibilities of a
stronger world organization. From this meeting came the Dublin Declaration,8
and, in February, 1946, a petition to the United Nations General Assembly,
gave proposals for amendments to the United Nations Charter according
to the procedure envisaged by Article 109.20
At about the same time, Senator Glen Taylor introduced a resolution
in the United States Senate, requesting the President to instruct his delegate
to the United Nations to call for a revision conference of the United Nations,
saying, as he did so, that the effect of the atomic bomb on him had been like
that on the man who turned around and saw a bear on his tracks. "It startled
me a good deal and hurried me up considerably." 21 This was the first of
18. U. S. Department of State, Charter of the United Nations, Report to the President on the Results of The San Francisco Conference, by the Chairman of the United
States Delegation, the Secretary of State, publication 2349 (Washington, 1945), p. 72,
ald pp. 167-169. The "automatic" revision conference provision is in art. 109, and places
the proposal on the agenda of the tenth annual session of the General Assembly, and
changes the two-thirds provision to a simple majority of the Members of the General
Assembly.
19. New York Times, October 16, 1945.
20. The text of these proposals is found in a pamphlet published by Clark and
others, Proposals for Amendment of the United Nations Charter, February 1, 1946, in
accordance with the Declaration Adopted by the Conference on World Government Held
at Dublin, New Hampshire, U.S.A., October 11-16, 1945: A Petition to the General
Assembly of the United Nations (New York: Council for Limited World Government,
31 Nassau Street, New York).
21. S. R. 183, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, 91 Congressional Record 9987 (October
24, 1945). The proposal was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and was
never heard of again.
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numerous Congressional resolutions for the revision of the United Nations
Charter. 2

The Rollins College Conference on World Government was held at the
invitation of President Hamilton Holt of Rollins College on March 11-16,
1946, n Winter Park, Florida. Under the chairmanship of Carl Van Doren,
the eminent American historian and author, an "Appeal to the Peoples of
the World" was drafted and signed by a big-name group of leaders from
the fields of business, politics, labor, nuclear physics, education and religion.2 3
Arguing that the United Nations "as now constituted, is a league of
sovereign states," and as such "cannot by law prevent armed conflict between
nations," the signers of the Appeal concluded that "since the Charter provides
for amendments, every effort should be made to transform the United Nations
into a world government," and accordingly proposed that:
. . . a General Conference of the United Nations be called as provided
in Artcle 109 of the Charter to draft amendments accomplishing the following objectives:
1. That the United Nations be transformed from a league of sovereign
states into a government deriving its specific powers from the people
of the world.
2. That the General Assembly he reconstituted as the legislative branch
of the world government, in which the citizens of the member states are
represented on an equitable basis.
3. That the General Assembly, in addition to its present functions,
shall have power:
a. To make laws prohibiting or otherwise controlling weapons of
mass destruction...
b. To make laws providing for such inspection as is necessary or

appropriate to the execution of the foregoing powers.
c. To provide for appropriate civil or criminal sanctions for the
laws enacted pursuant to the foregoing powers.
d. To provide and maintain such police forces as are necessary for
law enforcement.

4. That independent judicial tribunals be created with jurisdiction
over cases and controversies arising under the laws enacted by the General
Assembly or involving questions concerning the interlpretation of the Charter.
Other provisions called for a Bill of Rights to protect individuals against

the laws made by the General Assembly, a Security Council transformed into
22. See note 23

infra.
23. Members of Congress who signed the Appeal were: Joseph H. Ball (D., Minne-

sota), Carl A. Hatch (I)., New Mexico), Charles M. I.alollette (R., Indiana), Claude
Pepper (D., Florida). Charles W. i'ohey (IW. New Hamipshire), and H. Jerry Voorhis

(D., California). Businessmen included: Ro~bcrt M. Gaylord, chairman of the Executive

Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers, W. 1'. Holliday, president

of Standard Oil Company of Ohio, and Owen D. Young, former chairman of the board

of General Electric Company. Justice William 0. Douglas was also one of the signers
of the Appeal. Atomic scientists included, S. K. Allison, Albert Einstein, I. I. Rabi,
H. D. Srayth and Harold Urey.
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an executive branch, and reservation to the member states of all powers not
4
delegated to the General Assembly.
The largest membership organization of the United States, United
World Federalists, Inc., has adopted this technique of achieving world government as its platform of ways and means. Several of the men who attended
the Dublin, New Hampshire, Conference, are leaders in this organization,
and it may be surmised that their ideas are controlling in the organization. At
any rate, in the second national convention of the United World Federalists
held in Minneapolis in November, 1948, the following statement was approved
by delegates from approximately 350 local chapters from 24 different states :2
We believe that peace is not merely the absence of war, but the presence of justice, of law, of order-in short, of government and the institutions of government; that world peace can be created and maintained only
finder a world federal government, universal and strong enough to prevent
armed conflict between nations, and having direct jurisdiction over the
individual in those matters within its authority.
Therefore, while endorsing the efforts of the United Nations to bring
about a world community favorable to peace, we will work to create a
world federal government with authority to enact, interpret and enforce
world law adequate to assure peace:
(1) by urging use of the amendment processes of the United
Nations to transform it into such a world federal government,
(2) by participating in unofficial international conferences, whether
private individuals, parliamentary or other groups, seeking. to produce
draft constitutions for consideration and possible adoption by the United
Nations or by national governments in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes; and
(3) by pursuing any other reasonable and lawful means to achieve
world federation.
While this statement of techniques is fairly comprehensive, in actual
practice the organized efforts of this group have been toward revision of the
United Nations Charter through the amendment processes provided therein.
To this end, their friends in Congress have been persuaded to introduce
legislative resolutions calling on the President of the United States to take
action in that direction. One of a group of a dozen similarly worded read as
follows:

25

24. Rollins College Conference on World Government, "An Appeal to the Peoples
of the World" (Winter Park, Florida, Institute of World Government, 1946).
25. "Statement of Beliefs and Purposes . . ." (New York, 1948) (mimeo'd).
The organization has about 40,000 members and is reputed to be the fastest growing
in the United States, having doubled its membership in a year.
26. H. Con. Resolutions 59-68 and their counterpart, S. C. R. 23, were introduced
July 9, 1947. (80th Congress, 1st Session) C. R. 8567, 8487. The latter, introduced by
Senator Ferguson for himself and Messrs. Tobey, Baldwin, Flanders, Cain, Byrd,
O'Mahoney, McMahon, Sparkman and Taylor, proposed similar action to "strengthen
the United Nations as an instrument to prevent war and maintain world peace."
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Whereas, all the world deeply desires durable peace; and
Whereas, the United Nations was created as an instrument to preserve
the peace of the world; and
Whereas, experience increasingly indicates that the United Nations in
it. 'sent structure is not fully adequate for this task ; and
Whereas, the United Nations Charter in its article 109 provides a procedure whereby the Charter of the United Nations may be revised and
amended:
Now, therefore, be it resolved, by the House of Representatives (the
Senate concurring), That it is the senise of the Congress that the President
of the United States should immediately take the initiative in calling a
general conference of the United Nations pursuant to Article 109 for the
purpose of making the United Nations capable of enicting, interpreting, and
enforcing world law to prevent war.
This is a fairly pure and logical little gem. Such pristine logic fared ill
in the push and pull of legislative discussion and pressures of interest groups of
varying ideologies. After holding extensive hearings in May. 1948, Chairman
Eaton of the House Foreign Affairs Committee leaned over backwards in his
efforts to accommodate everyone and introduced an "'oinibus bill" so-called,
but it disappeared in the final rush of legislation. It ought better to have been
called a "junkwagon" bill. The main purpose of the bill, in the first place, had
been to get $65 million to build an adequate physical structure for the
permanent offices of the United Nations in New York. This was only accomplished by the passage of a Senate bill in the special session called by Mr.
Truman. This procedure was made necessary partly because of the following
policy provisions Eaton had seen fit to write into the House measure, a
conglomeration of illogical, inconsistent notions, an "omnibus" bill indeed: 27
It is the policy of the people 'ofthe United States through constitutional
processes to strive to accomplish the aims and purposes set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations and to strengthen the United Nations by(1) confirming the status of the United Nations in its site within the
United States with appropriate privileges and immunities, facilitating its
headquarters building program, and 'increasing the effectiveness of the
United States in the work of the United Nations;
(2) seeking by voluntary agreements, interpretations, and practices
to improve the functioning of the United Nations, to liberalize the voting
procedures in the Security Council, and to eliminate the veto on all questions
involving the pacific settlement of international disputes and situations and
the admission of new members;
(3) pressing for agreements to provide the United Nations with
armed forces as contemplated in the Charter, and for agreements to achieve
universal control of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation
27. Invaluable for an understanding of the Congressional mind are U. S. House of

Representatives, 80th Cong. 2d Sess., The Structure of the United Nations and the
Relations of the United States to the United Nations, Hearings before the Committee on
Foreiqn Affairs, May 4-14, 1948 (Washington, 1948). Cited hereafter as Structure of

1N. Hearings. H, R. 6802, quoted above, may be considered the direct result of these
hearings. Referred June 3 and reported June 9 from the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
but no action taken prior to adjournment.
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and reduction of armaments including armed forces under adequatte ,afeguards to protect complying nations against violation and evasion ;
(4) encouraging, and associating the United States with such regional
and other collective arrangements for self-defense as are consistent with 111th
Charter, and are based on continuous and effective self-help and nmutual aid
between free nations, and affect the national security of the United States;
and making clear the determination of the United States to exercise the right
under the.Charter of individual or collective self-defense in the event of
any armed attack against a member affecting the national security of tie
United States; and
(5) initiating consultations with other members concerning the need
for and possibility of so amending the Charter as to enable the United
Nations more effectively to prohibit, and prevent aggression or other
breaches of the peace.
Here indeed is a heterogeneous collection of Congressional ideas as to
the proper means of conducting foreign relations to achieve world peace. It
is undoubtedly important to have adequate physical facilities for the UN
organizations' various activities, meetings, conferences, etc. It is thought
necessary, also, to eliminate the veto power-that same veto power that the
United States Senate had so nobly insisted on before the San Francisco confereuce when the majority-vs.-minority lines had not yet formed in the yet
unformed Security Council. 28 It is thought, by these Congressmen, that
elimination of the "troublesome" Rnssian-Polish-Ukrainian-Byelorussian veto,
which might have been the British-American veto had postwar alignments
shaped up differently, will solve the problem of world peace. While it may
not solve the problem of world peace, it would undoubtedly solve the problem
of the Russian-etc., veto. The velvet veto in the Security Council would
merely le peeled off the steel (or "Stalin") veto in the industrial cities and
the secret-size. armies of Eurasia. 2 9 It is thought, by these Congressmen, that
"universal regulation and reduction of armaments" will promote international
cooperation for peace, despite the fact that most of these Congressmen are
not youngsters and many were in public life during the 'twenties and 'thirties
when various so-called disarmanent conferences were in the height of fashion.
From disarmament conferences they became "reduction of armament" conferences, dwindled to "limitation of armament" conferences; metamorphosing
finally into extremely technical and learned discussions as to the extent to
28. U. S. Senate, 79th Cong. 2d Sess., United Nations Charter, Hearings before the
Committee on Ioreign Relations, 1945.
29. "It is lnmt necessary to do inore than guess at the reasons why both Russia and
the Unitcd States insisted on this provision at San Francisco. Neither wanted to risk an
alignment of a majority with time other. Communists and capitalists, about equally fervent
in their ideologies. had come to feel about equally also, that their homelands were islands
in a wavering or actively hostile world. With the war still in progress, there were still
too many incertain areas for either to be confident of control if anything less than
unanimity was required. Asia, the Near East, India, and even Western Europe-something like two-thirds of the world's people-lived in these doubtful areas. And certainly
they possessed enough votes, even oil the one-tation-one-vote principle, to control a
Majority." Tugwell. 2 ContssoN CAIS. 250 (February, 1949).
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which nations would be "permitted" to increase their armaments programs!
While this same pattern has been repeated in the meetings of the Political
Subcommittee of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and in the
meetings of the Military Staff Committee and in the meetings of the United
Nations Conventional (sic) Armaments Committee following World War IT,
one would think that the Congressmen would despair of attempting armament
or disarmament once again, or even "regulation" of armaments. But perhaps
a combination of depriving Russia of the veto and then depriving Russia of
armaments is the procedure the Congressmen have in mind.
In the provision of subparagraph (4) quoted above, there seems to be
some notion that the United Nations organization can be used, or is being
used, as an instrument in the power politics struggle against Russia, judging
from the expression of a desire to encourage "collective self-defense" arrangements among "free nations." This theme runs like a bass counterpoint through
the Congressional hearings on the United Nations cited above.
Among all these hoary devices for achieving permanent world peace-short
of world government-the proposal that the UN Charter be revised into a
world federal constitution is virtually lost in the shuffle, and appears only as a
policy of "initiating consultations with other members," not even using the
phraseology of the Charter.
The Congressmen were, to tell the truth, doubtful about the wisdom of
saying anything at all about the slight disabilities of the United Nations. They
inquired rather timidly and respectfully of General Marshall as to whaether
they should tread on the sacred precincts of foreign policy. He was very
reassuring, indeed almost patronizing, although their attitudes may have
invited his: 80
Mr. RICHARDS. Do you feel that it would be helpful or harmful for
the Congress of the United States to express its viewpoint on this question ?
(Modification of the veto power.)
Secretary MARSHALL. I think that would be helpful because it tends
to help form world opinion.
Mr. RICHARDS. You would not oppose a resolution expressing the
viewpoint of the Congress and stating that the Charter should be amended in
certain particulars ?...
Secretary MARSHALL. No, Sir....
Mr. JUDD. Let me put it frankly: does the Secretary feel that it would
be harmful to the interests of the United States and world peace for us to
pass a resolution expressing the view of the Congress that the United States
should take the initiative in calling a world conference to re-examine the
sick patient and see if we cannot get agreement on how to treat it? What
harm can come out of that?
Secretary MARSHALL. If such a resolution does not, in its phrasing,
threaten the continuation of the United Nations, then I would see no particular objection to it. ...
30. Op. cit., note 24 supra at p. 60.

WORLD GOVERNMENT
Secretary Marshall went farther in his prepared testimony before the
3
House Committee. In it, he said, '
We are not opposed to amendment of the Charter in principle, provided
that revision would generally strengthen the work of the United Nations, and
that it is strongly supported by the Congress and the American people, with
full knowledge of its implications for the United States. That is a very important thing.
One implication about which he was worried was that the mere elimination of the veto power might enable a majority of nations to involve the United
States in a shooting war.3 2 With a veto-less Charter, it would be difficult for
the military arm of the American government to plan on contingencies like
this. He added that the United Nations was a convenient instrument of
negotiation with the great powers of the world: 33
Under the auspices of the United Nations, we are meeting with the
Soviet Union on hundred of matters each year. It is awfully easy to terminate
negotiations, hut it is difficult to resume them, and it is hard to tell what will
occur in the interim . . . I think I should say, though I am a little hesitant
to say it in open session, that I am under constant pressure from other
nations to try in every conceivable way to avoid a rupture.
The above quotations have indicated the attitudes of many leaders in the
world government movement, members of Congress, and the former Secretary
of State, to the proposal that world government should come through revision
of the United Nations Charter by the processes indicated in Article 109 of
the Charter itself. It is the expressed hope of those in the former categories,
and presumably of Secretary Marshall himself, that such a General Revision
Conference of the United Nations may become the Founding Convention for
a world constitution in a manner analogous to our Federal Convention in
Philadelphia in 1781.
It is one of the purposes of this article to examine into the reasonability
of this hope. The inquiry will take two directions. First, is this approach to
world government likely to be productive of the desired results? Second,
is this approach a constitutional approach, or at least, does it accord with our
traditional ideas of political and legal propriety?
In approaching the first question, it might be worthwhile to examine the
validity of the analogy-for it is nothing more than this-of the present world
situation with the situation on the Atlantic seaboard in 1785. There were
precedents for federal union then, as there are now.3 4 There was a fairly
31. Id. at p. 53.
32. Id. at p. 57.
33. Op. cit., p.55 (see note 24 supra).
34. E.g., the Albany Plan of Union, 1754, largely the work of Blenjamin
riu'rnin.
"Everybody cries, a Union is absolutely necessary; but when they com: to tht Manner
& Form of the Union, their weak Noddles are perfectly distracted." McLkuciiu.
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weak confederation among all the states then; we have a weaker confederation of nearly all the nations now. 8 The Declaration of Independence then
expressed beliefs which were commonly shared,3 6 and today the United
7
Nations has been able to agree on a Universal Declaration of Human Rights.'
Every nation in the world today, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and
Yemen-and possibly a few others-has more or less elaborate provisions
in its constitution or statutes for the Rights of Man.38
The 13 United States of 1787 were unequal in population, the ratio of
variance being more than 12 (Virginia) to 1 (Delaware). The nations of
today -are also unequal in population, China being about 3,500 times as
populous as Iceland, both members of the United Nations. 89 The 13 of 1787
were unequal in geographical area, the variance being about 153 (Georgia)
to 1.36 (Rhode Island). The comparison of the Soviet Union with, for
example, Belgium or Luxembourg is not much more shocking.
The national and ethnic origins of the population of the 13 States were
remarkably diverse, though New England was most homogeneous. More
than one-sixth of the total inhabitants, about 700,000, were Negro slaves.
In 1790 the white population of English background varied from 60 per cent
in Maine to 82 per cent in Massachusetts, but in the Middle States, Germans
constituted one-third of the population of Pennsylvania, while more than
one in six of the people of New York and New Jersey were of Dutch descent.
Nearly ten per cent of the inhabitants of Delaware were Swedes. In the
Southern States, the proportion of whites of English origin varied from 57.4
per cent in Georgia to 68.5 per cent in Virginia. More than eight different
national stocks contributed to th total white population of the 13 States.' 0
Toleration of religious differences in the States was not universal. The
debates in the conventions ratifying the Federal Constitution contained, examples of religious friction. A Mr. Singletary of Massachusetts inquired
whether there were any protections in the Constitution against a Papist or
an Infidel being chosen to a Federal office. 4I And while Maryland's ConCONSTITUTIONAL HISTOgY OF THE UNITED STATES 22 (New York, 1935),
FRANKLIN, WiuTINGS (Smyth ed.) Vol. 3, p. 227 note.

quoting from

35. Non-members of the UN include most of the "is nations, all of the traditional
neutrals except Sweden, as well as various colonies and recently independent nations,

e.g., Indonesia.

36. According to.Thomas Jefferson. See MERLE CuRTI, THE GRownT oF AvMaCAw

THOUGHT 139 (New York, 1943).

37. U. S. Department of State, Universal Declarationof Human Rights, pub. 3381
(Washington, 1949).
38. United Nations. Yearbook on Human Rights Jar 1946 (Lake Success, 1947).
39. Richard J.Hooker, The Background of Federal Union, Community and Confliet
in the Thirteen States,- 1 CoM ON CAUsE 47 (August, 1947).
40. Ibid. Hooker's population figures are from the Bureau of the Census, A Century
of Population Growth from the First Census of the United States to Twelfth (Wash-

ington, 1909).
41. 2 JONATHAN Eiuorr, THE
ON THE

AoPTIoN

ELLIOrr, DEBATES.

DEBATES
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44 (2d ed. 1836). Cited hereafter as
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stitution of 1776 excused "Quakers, Dunkers and Menonists" from taking
the oath, it extended religious liberty only to those who professed. the Christian
religion. The Constitution of 1851 extended this liberty to all religious
believers. A similar provision in the Constitution of Massachusetts of 1780
2
was also corrected later.4
The colonies of 1785 were actually less united physically than is the world
today. The trip from Boston to New York along the finest road in the country
took from four days to a week. Today, no spot on the globe, according to
the advertisements of the commercial air transport companies, is more than
sixty flying hours away. And the invention of the telegraph, telephone and
wireless radio nullifies even this time, replacing the more glamorous pony
express or special messenger.
Unfortunately, the sense of physical unity was unrelated to social and
political differences then---even as now.
A vast difference naturally existed socially and politically, as well as
economically, between the Southern tobacco or rice planter, with hundreds
of slaves and. thousands of acres, and the New England farmer who, with
his family, worked a hundred stony acres. The one was ruler of a feudal
manor and, as obvious leader of his district, regularly joined with other
planters to control local and state government. The New England farmer
met with his fellow "plough-joggers" in the highly-democratic town meeting. ....43
One hardbitten old Massachusetts farmer is on record as saying that he
would never consent to permanent national union with a foreign state like
44
South Carolina where everyone knew slave labor existed.
There was, too, in the "United" States of 1785 the same despair as to the
prospects of union as we find in the "United" Nations today. Thomas Paine
wrote: 45
Made up as it is of people from different nations, accustomed to different forms and habits of government, speaking different languages, and more
different in their modes of worship, it would appear that the union of such
a people is impracticable.
And George Washington is reported by one of the members of the Founding Convention to have counseled them in the anxious faltering days when they
were waiting for a quorum of the states to appear in Philadelphia:

42. 3 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 1689-90, 1715, 1889, 1914 (Washington, 1909).

43. Hooker, op. cit., p. 54. See also CARL VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL
(New York, 1948).
44. ELLIOTT, DEBATES 219.
45. Quoted in VERNO N NASH, IT MUST BE DONE AGAIN, p. 10 (New York, 1948).
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It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps
another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the people. we
offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work?
Let us raise a standard to which the wise and honest can repair ..4
And Madison, writing in the months before the Convention:
I find men of reflection much less sanguine as to a new, than despondent
as to the present, system .... The nearer the crisis approaches, the more I

tremble for the issue. The necessity of gaining the concurrence of the
Convention in some system that will answer the purpose, the subsequent
approbation of Congress, and the final sanction of the States, present a
series of chances which would
inspire despair in any case where the alterna47
tive was less formidable.
Thus, it would seem that the general outlook was similar then and now.
There were some factors, present then, but not now, which would make their
task easier. But there are some factors present now, but not then, which
would make the task of world government advocates easier. In a matter of
degree of difficulty, estimates and opinions can differ.
To be more specific regarding the legal and political analogy between
then and now, the United States in Congress Assembled had finished a successful war against Great Britain in 1783 and the United Nations in a loose
military alliance had completed a successful war against the Axis powers.
In the former case, however, the peace treaty was made by the United States,
while the peace treaties are yet to be made today between the Axis powers
and the once allied United Nations. 48 The confederation of the United Nations
was formed at the end of the war, while the confederation of the United States
had been formed early in the Revolution. On paper, they were much alike.
Both maintained that the constituent states were sovereign, for example.
Both United Nations Charter and Articles of Confederation provided for joint
executive action only if the states acquiesced. The powers granted to both could
only be exercised with the consent of all the states, although both Articles and
Charter provided for recommendations or decisions of procedural importance
4
being made without the concurrence of all the members.
46. 3 FARRAND, THE REcoRa OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1887 381-382 (Rev.
Ed., New Haven, 1937).
47. 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WiuTINGS OF JAMES MADISON 279, 317 (New York,
1884), quoted in Hooker, op. cit., p. 48.
48. Treaties of peace have been concluded with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania
and Finland. U. S. Department of State, pub. 2743 (Washington, 1947).
49. Articles, II: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and
every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated
... " Charter, Ii: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its Members." Articles, IX "The United States in Congress Assembled shall have
authority . . .to make requisitions from each State for its quota of land forces . . .;
Charter, 45: "In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures,
Members shall hold immediately available national air force contingents. . ."Articles, X:
"The committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute soh
*

. . powers . . . by the consent of nine States . . . "; Charter, 27: "Decisions of tl.-
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. Both then and now relations among the member States began to
deteriorate after their wars. Boundary disputes between Greece and Bulgaria
today had their parallel in those between Pennsylvania and Connecticut, not
excluding full scale guerilla warfare. In both cases .., mediation of the confederations brought no relief. Other examples of analogous difficulties and
frictions might be cited at wearisome lengths.
Finally, in January, 1786, a meeting of commissioners from the several
states was called, at the initiative of the Legislature of Virginia, to meet in the
fall at Annapolis, Maryland.50 It had originated in the minds of a few men,
concerned with the commercial chaos overcreeping the States.5 ' Here the
parallel between 1785 and 1949 abruptly ends.
No such meeting preliminary to the calling of a Federal Constitut;kt!
Convention for the world has yet been called or.held. If, however, we were to
follow in the future days the precedents set ':;0 years ago, we should find a
procedure quite different from that envisaged by the advocates of the proposal
to amend the United Nations Charter by means of a general revision conference.
Here is what might happen if we tried to hew as closely as possible to the
experiences of past history.
(1) About twenty of the nations of the world respond to a formal call
issued by the Congress of the United States through its representative in the
Interparliamentary Union-thus ignoring the United Nations organization
inviting the legislative bodies of each nation to appoint delegates to a
conference to discuss, let us say, the problem of the international control of
atomic energy, or the problem of the protection of civil rights. The Soviet
Union is among those ignoring the invitation. 52
Security Council on all other (than procedural) matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members."
50. Resolution of the General Assembly of Virginia, January 21, 1786, proposing a
joint meeting of commissioners from the States to consider and recommend a Federal
plan for regulating Commerce." U. S. Library of Congress, Legislative Reference
Service, Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States,
69th Cong., 1st Sess., H. R. Doc. 398 (Washington, 1927), selected by Charles C. Tansill,
p. 38.
5I. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 103 ff.
(Boston. 1890). Professor Burgess claimed that while the necessity of a stronger Union
had impressed both Bowdoin of Massachusetts and Hamilton of New York quite early,
it was Hamilton who was able to push the important State of New York into co-operation
with the Annapolis Convention. get himself elected as a delegate, and persuade the
delegates from the five states represented there, to move for a more general mandate
from their States. The matter was of general concern to political leaders in several of
the States. however, and notably Washington who had arranged a meeting as early as
March, 1785 at his home for representatives of Virginia and Maryland to discuss the
navigation of the Potomac River.
52. This first step would be analogous to the Annapolis Convention, at which only
five of the 13 States were represented, Virginia, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and
Delaware. The commissioners from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
North Carolina, although appointed, did not show up. Connecticut, Maryland, South
Carolina and Georgia appointed none. The Virginia legislature ignored the Continental
Congress in its original resolution, except to mention that they hoped the recommendations of the Convention would "when unanimously ratified by the States, enable the
United States in -Congress Assemblyed, effectually to provide for" (the regulation of
commerce).
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(2)

Tie delegaqtes, arriving at the meeting place and finding so few

nations represented, prepare a report to their respective national legislatures,
recommending that a new meeting be held at which a broader approach may
be taken to the whole problem of world peace. They recommend inviting every
national legislature to appoint delegates and suggest that these delegates form
a convention to discuss the defects of the United Nations and to propose a
new Plan. They then adjourn their meeting, after sending a copy of the
53
resolution, out of courtesy, to the Secretariat of the United Nations.
(3) The Congress of the United States follows immediately with the
appointment of some of its own members, a retired Supreme Court Justice and
the Vice President of the United States, together with a detailed statement of
the necessity of holding such a cbnvention. If the rule of analogy we follow
is "Do not change the method of amendment provided for in the original
Charter (or Articles)," then the Congress would provide for the ratification
of the results of such a convention by the orthodox treaty method. If the
rule of analogy is "Do exactly what was done in 1786," then the Congress
would specify that the revisions be returned to the national legislatures for
ratification after having been approved by the United Nations General Assetubly. That there are two rules here, either of which might be followed,
is because legislatures in those days were much less timid about external
affairs than they are today. Despite clamorous protestations to the contrary on
the part of Congressmen, practically the legislatures have abdicated to the
4
executive so far as initiation and conduct of international affairs is concerned.5
(4) After the legislatures of half of the other nations pf the world have
appointed delegates, the General Assembly of the United Nations issues an
official call to all the members of the United Nations and perhaps to nonmember nations as well-to have delegates appointed by their legislatures to
attend this world convention for the purpose of strengthening the United
53. The Report of the Commissioners to their respective -States pointed out that
"the State of New Jersey has enlarged tile object of their appointment, empowering their
Commissioners 'to consider how far an uniform Sytem in their Commercial Regulations,
and other important matters might be necessary to tile comminon interest and permanent
harmony of the several States'; and to 'report such an Act on the Subject, as when
ratified by them' would 'enable the United States in Congress Assembled effectually to
provide for the exigencies of the Union.' " op. cit., note 47 supra at pp. 39-43. They were
exceeding their instructions to recommend a new meeting whose terms of reference were

to correspond with those of the New Jersey delegation, op. cit., p. 43. The delegates
reported directly to their States, but "nevertheless concluded from motives of respect
to transmit Copies of this Report to the United States in Congress Assembled, and to
the Executives of the other States." toe. cit.
54. The State of Virginia was the most populous state and took the initiative in
most of these actions. Almost immediately following the adjournment of the Annapolis
Convention, the Virginia Assembly elected seven Commissioners and issued a long
statement giving them their credentials and outlining the need for a convention. This
action was followed the next month by New Jersey and the other states soon after,
borrowing in most instances the phraseology of the Virginia Declaration. The Virginia
delegation was composed of the foremost men of the state, including General Washingt-,
Governor Edmund Randolph, former Governor Patrick Henry, who declined the hono,
saying he "smelt a Rat." 3 FARRAND, GEORGE MASON AND YOUNG JAMES MADIsoN 560 fl.
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Nations organization.

The terms of

the call

follow

the

pihrasetology

of the United States Congress' invitation. They are that the convemtion

deliberate on proposals to make the United Nations structure more adequate to
the exigencies of the Union and the establishment of world peace. and that
any proposals the delegates make be submitted to the United Nations itself for
approval before going to the national legislatures for their approval. Whereupon the legislatures of the other member nations appoint delegates with
similar instructions.5
(5) The delegates assemble at the place suggested in the invitation of
the United States Congress, and finding that a quorum of nations is represented. proceed to organize themselves for the business of the convention.
From this point on, it would be difficult to predict the outcome. It should
be noted that the delegates to the Philadelphia convention in 1787 decided after
much discussion that it would be necessary not merely to revise the Articles of
Confederation but to*discard them and construct a national government
constitution. They expressly exceeded their terms of reference and their
instructions by proposing a means of ratification of their proposals different
from that specified. 56
As can be seen frdn the preceding discussion, the parallels between 1786
and the present are yet to be made. All of the essential ingredients of the
prttlem then are present now, but there are differences in degree of physical
conmmnity, economic and cultural community, no one of which is conclusive
enotigh to change the character of the problem. One possible essential difference which has been noted before and which has not been mentioned here is
the psychological necessity of banding together agaitst an outside threat,

55. The Continental Congress finally issued its own call, after six states had already
resolved and appointed delegates, February 21, 1787. The Virginia Declaration of

October 16, 1786 directed the state's deputies to devise "such Alterations and farther
Provisons as may be necessary to render the Foederal Constitution adequate to the
exigencies of the Union and in reporting such an Act for that purpose to the United
States in Congress assembled as when agreed to by them and duly confirmed by the

several States will effectually provide for the same." Compare the directions of the
Continental. Congress: "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of

Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures ... ' Inc. cit., and p.
584.
56. See TnF. FEDERALIST, No. 40. There are very few countries of the world which
do not have popularly elected legislative bodies. The 1948 World Almanac fails to mention
any for 15 political subdivisions of the world, having a total population of approximately
155 million. Of these, 68 million are in French colonial possessions, some of which have
elected representatives in the French National Assembly. All of the thirteen StaLes had

them, although they were chosen by an extremely restricted electorate. Only one state,
Vermont, had manhood suffrage, women not then being considered competent to participate
in government. IE South Carolinians believed in God, owned 50 acres of land or could pay
a tax on its equivalent and were the sons of white-skinned parents, they were eligible to

vote. After the Federal Constitution was adopted, the requirement of belief in God was
omitted, presumably due to the liberalizing influence of the Federal Constitution.
MCLAUGHLIN, TisE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF Til- UNITFD STATEs 367 (New York,
1935).
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namely, the nations of Europe.57 There is a pronounced lack of a threat of
invasion from Mars to unify the peoples of the world.
Leaving aside this consideration, which is beyond our power to modify,
there is one serious divergence between practice then and now. This is the
relative importance of the legislature and the executive in initiating negotiations with other states on this matter, It is the more troublesome because
practice in these days has been for the legislature to let slip from its hands
the control of foreign relations and place it in the hands of the executive.
The constitutions of the states prior to the formation of the Federal Union,
however, placed most of the power of their governments in the hands of the
legislatures. There was a fear of a strong executive, well-based on experience
with royal governors. The divergence is troublesome, because the dilemma
it creates is really a crucial one of fundamental political principles. It may be
stated as follows: those persons in present-day governments who are
assuming the responsibility and powers of conducting the foreign relations and
commanding the armed forces of each nation are the same persons of whom
these powers would be divested in the course of establishing a world federation. This is axiomatic, since the very minimum of powers which a world
federation must have to be workable includes those of regulation of international relations and the instruments of war. 5
The other horn of the dilemma is simply stated in Lord Acton's famous
and almost equally axiomatic dictum, "All power corrupts, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely." There have been so few examples in history of the
voluntary renunciation of power that we may be justified in regarding them
as exceptional occurrences.
The problem of divesting the state legislatures of their power to regulate
interstate affairs and military affairs was fairly easily solved in the Philadelphia
convention by the bold and revolutionary step of referring the completed
constitution, not to the State legislatures as the delegates had been instructed,
but to State conventions, specially elected for the purpose of ratification by the
limited electorate of that time. 59 Whether it would be as easy to by-pass the
57. Op. cit., nos. 5, 6, 11 and 16. "Under a vigorous national government, the natural
strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest; would baffle all the
combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth." No. 16, p. 65 (Washington,
sesquicentennial edition, 1937).
58. CFWC, op. cit., pp. 22-23 (microfilm ed.).
59. "Colonel Mason considered a reference of the plan to the authority of the people
as one of the most important and essential Resolutions. The Legislatures have no power
to ratify it. They are the mere creatures of the State Constitutions and cannot be greater
than their creators.... Mr. RANDOLPH ... Whose opposition will be most likely to be
excited against the System? That of the local demagogues who will be degraded by it
from the importance they now hold. These will spare no efforts to impede that progress
in the popular mind which will be necessary to the adoption of the plan .... It is of great
importance therefore that the consideration of this subject should be transferred from the
legislatures where this class of men have their full influence to a field in which :heir
efforts can be less mischievous. . . . Madison's Notes on the Federal Convention, Jul3 73,
1787, reprinted in U. S. Library of Congress, op. cit., pp. 434-439.
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executives of every country is a question which can be answered finally only
by future developments. It was a revolutionary act in every sense of the word
except the bloody one, which consisted of outwitting the legislatures who
maintained control of the situation as long as they could sit back and approve
whatever measures issued from the Philadelphia convention.
The delegates were aware that they had exceeded their instructions, but
they justified their action by an appeal to necessity.
In one particular it is admitted that the convention has departed from
the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the
confirmation of the legislatures of all the states, they have reported a plan
which is to be confirmed by the people, and may be carried into effect by
nine states only... . Let us view the ground on whicii the Convention stood.
It may be collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply and
unanimously impressed with the crisis which had led their country almost
with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting
the errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced; that they were
no less deeply and unanimously convinced that such a reform as they have
proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment .... They had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment, the

alacrity with which the proposition made by a single State (Virginia)-,
towards a partial amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to
and promoted. They had seen the liberty assumed by a very few deputies
from a very few States, convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great
and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified
by the public opinion, but actually carried into effect by twelve out of the
thirteen States.

-

. .They must have reflected, that in all great changes of

established governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a
rigid adherence in such cases to the former would render nominal and
nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to "abolish or
alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
safety and happiness," since it is impossible for the people spontaneously
and universally to move in concert toward their object, and it is therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some informal and unauthorized propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or
number of citizens. They must have recollected that it was by this irregular
and assumed privilege of proposing to the people plans for their safety and
happiness, that the States were first united against the danger with which
they were threatened by their ancient government; that committees and
congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts and defending their
rights; and that conventions were elected in the several States for establishing the constitutions under which they are now governed, nor could it have
been forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to
ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge
under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance contended for They
must have borne in mind, that, as the plan to be framed and proposed was
to be submitted to the people themselves, the disapprobation of this supreme
authority would destroy it for ever; its approbation blot out antecedent
errors and irregularities....
. If there be a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of nio
control, let me then ask what sentence he has in 'reserve for the twelve
States who usurped the power of sending deputies to the convention, a body
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utterly unknown to their constitutions; for Congress, who recommended
the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the Confederation; and
for the State of New York, in particular, which first urged and then complied
with this unauthorized interposition? 60
The recognition of the supra-legal origin of the Federal Convention,
thus made explicit by one of its members, has been assented to by later commentators.01
The difficulty today is not so much with the legislatures of this or of other
countries. They have pretty well abdicated to the executive branch. There
is thus a genuine question as to whether the national legislature can "interfere"
with the executive's conduct of foreign relations. Several of the Congressmen
at the hearings in May, 1948 on the revision of the United Nations Charter
were preoccupied with this problem.
Mr. VORYS. You said this (reading):
"Only the Congress can take the initiative for the American people
in advocating the need for better machinery for assuring peace and preserving freedom."
Every time we study this thing we find that in our foreign relations
only the Executive can take the initiative for the American people in
advocating the need for better machinery, under the United Nations Charter
and our existing legislation, and our Executive is not taking such initiative.
Where do you get the idea that "only Congress can take the initiative"
in this matter?
Mr. (William L.) BATT. It would seem to me, Mr. Vorys, as a layman, that the attitude of the State Department, which, of course, is a part
of the Executive, has materially changed during the last weeks that this body
has been holding its hearings.
Mr. VORYS. If by merely holding these hearings we can bring encouragement and turpentine and so forth, where they will be helpful, that
is what we are doing. However, every resolution that is pending here so far
starts off about like this: (reading)
"It is the sense of the Congress that the President should-" and
so forth.
That is a recognition of the peculiarly responsible62and powerful position that the Executive has in our constitutional set-up.
From the standpoint of Lord Acton's dictum, both Executive and Legislature are interested parties who, practically, share control of foreign affairs,
though the lattei's be negative control only. As members of national govern60. THE FEDERALIST, No. 40.
61. See for example, BuRGEss, I POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITuTIONAL LAW 104-108 (Boston, 1890).
62. Structure of UNN, Hearings, p. 412. Elsewhere in the hearings Congressman

Vorys expressed the belief that Congress should take the initiative in proposing specific
measures in. the form of law and if necessary even going beyond the Executive in trying
to implement them. He believed that the method of executive negotiation had led nowhere
in the past. See op. cit., 236-238, 260, 288 and comments on the testimony of W. T.
Holliday, President of Standard Oil Company of Ohio, pp. 256-260.
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ments, therefore, they would stand to lose some of their vested interests in the
control of foreign relations by the formation of a world federation having
exclusive jurisdiction in the area of inter-nation relations.
There have been two views of the power of the national Government in
the conduct of foreign affairs. One is that the national Government is the
sole and exclusive and unlimited agency to exercise this power.63 The other
is that while this power now rests in the national Government and is exercised
only by it, it may at any time be exercised concurrently or exclusively
by the people of the nation acting in their sovereign capacity. 4 These two
views are. of course, not mutually exclusive. To say, as Justice Sutherland said,
in the Curtiss-14'right case, that the national Government-and especially the
President-is the sole agency with the right to exercise the fordign affairs
function, is not to deny that if sonie better technique is devised, some more
fitting and proper agency, the people may not delegate authority to the
latter, either concurrently, or exclusively, temporarily or permanently, in a
general way or in a specific field df jurisdiction." If we proceed on this assumption, it is not necessary to question the validity of Sutherland's questionable historical myth that "the states never possessed international powers." 61
Let us examine the first contention in connection with the proposal that
the national government's representatives in foreign affairs should take the
necessary steps to call a revision conference of the United Nations to amend
the Charter.
It has been said that the President of the United States has sole authority
to negotiate agreements between nations 6 7 This authority has been denied
to the states, unless with Congressional consent.68 It has been denied to the
Congress of the United States and to the United States Senate,6 9 whose advice

and consent are necessary to the ratificatiotiof treaties. Finally, private citizens
are forbidden by law to enter into negotiations with foreign governments with
intent to influence the foreign policy of the United States.7 0
63. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299. U. S. 304.
64. See infra note 74.
65. "\Vhen the Constitution was framed, therefore, the undivided powers
sovereignty were in the Union . . . and the only question to be determined
shall be given to the general government and made active, and what shall be
the people. and lie dormant?" GErOGE SUTHEFRI.AND, THE
\VoRt.' AFFAIRS 45 (New York, 1919).

CONSTITUTIONAL

(1936).
of external
was, What
reserved to
POWER AND

66. Sutherland's historical sense or lack of it has already been devastated by the
analysis of C, Perry Patterson, In re U. S. 7,. Curiiss-H/riht, Export Corporatlion, 22
Tr.x. L. REv. 286 and 445 (1944). The statement is quoted from U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright,
299 U. S. 304 at 316 (1936). However, we reserve the right, where myths are corzerned,
to choose those which best serve the dire necessities of the time.
67. United States v. Belmont. 301 U S. 324, 331 (1937) ; United States v. CurtissWright. 299 U. S, 304, 320 (1936). See also CORWIx, TIlE PRsaxxr: OFFIcE AND
PowERs (2d ed. 1941).
68. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920) ; U. S. Coxsi. Art. 1, § 10; WRIGHT,
CONTROl. OF AMtERICAN FOREIGN RELATIOs 230 (New York, 1922).
69. See FLEMING, THIE TREATY VETO OF THE AMERICAX SENATE 24-32 (New York,

1930).

70. "Every citizen.

who, without the permission or authority of the government,
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It is not to be denied that the states; Congress, the Senate and even
influential private citizens sometimes have a direct and important influence
on the actual conduct of foreign affairs. It is only to say that this influence
must be exercised with the active cooperation of the President and the
Department of State to be of much positive influence. Or to put it another
way, it would be very difficult for these to exercise positive initiative in a
direction contrary -to the foreign policy being followed by the President and
the Department of State.
The proposal of Representative Ludlow for a war referendum in the
isolationist days of the 'thirties is on a different level. This was an attempt,
however awkward, to get the consent of the sovereign people on a question1
which would affect their lives, safety and iappiness. 7 ' The palpable error
in logic behind the Congressman's proposal was in the assumption that the
people of the United States could make the decision on peace or war. These
decisions are made for them by the leaders of other countries over whom
they have no control-and the people of other countries likewise have the
decision made for them without their control. Without world law there is no
world responsibility.
Is there no limitation then, on the power of the President to negotiate
agreemrents with other nations? There seem to be two types of limitation.
One is a practical limit; the other is a theoretical one. Practically, the President
cannot go further than the point at which Congress is unwilling to support
him or his agreements if they are non-self-executing. But, in practice, this has
not worked out to be much of a limitation? 2 Much more of a practicat limitation is the fact that so far neither the President nor the Congress has seen
fit to take the initiative in negotiating a conference for world government.
although Mr. Truman was overheard by a newspaperman on his way back from
the San Francisco Conierence saying something to the effect that there
was no reason why the nations of the world could not eventually form an
organization like that of the 48 States. Beyond this, nothing has been heard
from or done by the White House.
The theoretical limitation, the constitutional limitation on the power
of the President in foreign affairs, is that he may not change the constitution
.. ,carries on any ... intercourse with any foreign government ...with an intent to
influence (it) . . . or to defeat the measures of the government of the United States . . .
shall be fined .. .or imprisoned ...." U. S. C., Tit. 18, § 5; see debates in Annals of
Congress, 12-27-1798 and following. Originally passed to prevent the repetition of the
attempt by a Quaker businessman. Logan, to prevent war between France and the
United States, the Act has been brandished at regular intervals at peace-loving citizens.
The latest suggestions for application were on Henry Ford for his 1915 "Peace Ship"
effort, and Henry Wallace for his 1947 European junket in the midst of the "cold war."
71. Specifically, it was for a constitutional amendment: "Congress, when it deems
a national crisis to exist in conformance wit this article, shall by concurrent resolution
refer the question (of declaration of war) to the people." 83 Co-,c.. REc. 276-283 (January
10, 1938). It was defeated on a motion to discharge from the Committee on Judici ry.
72. MCCLURE, INTERATIONAi. EXECUrVE AGREFU..%ErNTs 321, 326 (1939).
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or form of government by treaty or executive agreement.' 3 May he negotiate
such changes subject to ratification 1y the sovereign people. the principals
for whom he is acting as agent ? There seems to he little doubt that tradition,
practice and the laws have given him that power.7 4
Only two questions remain to be discussed. First. are there any practical
objections in the form of insuperable difficulties involved in Presidential negotiation with the heads of other States for a genuine world government
proposal ? That is. would negotiation in such a manner be likely to achieve
a viable workl constitution proposal? Second. max' the people who are sovereign
withdraw the powers in foreigm relations which they have delegated to the
President and grat them to other representatives or delegates specially selected
or otherwise exercise these powers themselves?
With regard to the first tluestion. it may be observed that the proposal
has already been made that presidential negotiation he the first step toward
world government. 6

Mr.

xVORYS.

Mr. Finletter. von stated at the end of your remarks a

sot of time table in which one of the steps-was a preliminary meeting be-

tween Chiefs of State; is that right ?
Mr. FINLETTER. That is correct, sir.
It may also be observed that the method of diplomatic negotiation has
never produced anything more than treaty agreements, as easily broken as
made. in fact, more easily broken than made.

73. The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall, 616 (U. S. 1870). "A treaty cannot change
the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument." Sutherland,
op. cit. note 63 supra; "No limitations upon the treaty-making power, therefore, exist
by reason of the terms by which the power is conferred, or by reason of any diret'ly
restrictive language; but as do exist, result from the nature and fundamental principles of
our government, which forbid that a treaty should 'change the constitution or be held
valid if it be in violation of that instrument.' " Id. at 143, CALHOUN, I WORKS 203-204
(New York, 1853) : "There still remains another and more important limitation; bt of
a more general anid indefinite character, It can enter into no stipulation calculated to
change the character of the government; or to do that which can only be done by the
constitution-making power." The constitution-making power he defines as being 'the
power which ordains and establishes the fundamental laws; which creates, organizes,
and invests government with its authority, and subjects it to restrictions." "Clearly the
National Government would not be competent by treaty to change the form of government
or usurp functions of the Constitution-making power or alter the nature or structure of
the government, or the objects for which it was formed. And this for the double reason
that it would not only violate the Constitution or the fundamental Principles on which it
rests, but also because it would constitute a gratuitous intrusion upon the purely ;nternal
affairs of the Nation." Sutherland, op. cit. p. 146 (italics added).
74. U. S. CONST. Art. II,§ 2, cl.2, and sec. 3; The Federalist, no. 75. See also,
CoRwI., PRFSIDENT, pp. 240-254, and note 123 at p. 420.
75. World government makes strange bedfellows. At the same time Thomas K.
Finletter, former State Department official, former Chairman of the President's Air Policy
Commission, present Chief of the European Cooperation Administration in England, was
advocating a meeting between the heads of State, Senator Glen Taylor, vice presidential
candidate of the Progressive Party was introducing another world government resolution
providing for a preliminary meeting between the heads of the "Big Two" powers. (S. C.
Ri's. 54, introduced May 3, 1948.)
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Mr. VORYS. That is one of the things that has failed so far every
time we have tried it in recent years. We have taken a diplomatic licking at
Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam; is that not true ?
Mr. FINLETTER. Mr. Congressman, I think I would be unprepared
to debate Tehran and Yalta.
Mr. VORYS. Your suggestion isthat we do the kind of thing that has
brought us to where we are, instead of trying to do something different....
This should not lead us to conclude that diplimatic negotiation may
not in the future produce more lasting results. Miracles have been known to
happen. But there are more serious objections or difficulties involved in the
problem of diplomatic negotiation by executives. In the first place, negotiators
are handicapped in their negotiations by an uncertainty as to whether their
negotiations will be upheld by the ratifying governments. In the case of the
United States, the problem is whether the proposal or treaty will be approved
or ratified by the memers of the Senate. If the proposal is in the form of a mere
executive agreement, not requiring the approval of the Senate. there is serious
doubt about the legality of such presidential action, without curing ratification at
some point by the people.716 if the President is merely to negotiate a constitution for world government to he ratified by the people or by the device of an
amendnent to the United States Constitution. then the question may be
asked whether officials of the government to be curtailed are appropriate
representatives of the people.
A Secretary of State speaks as a representative of a sovereign government which has a past, not as a private citizen expressing a personal opinion.
For this reason, General Marshall is morally obligated to do everything
within his power to make the United Nations work as it is now constituted.
He must stand on the bridge with the other captains of sovereign states as
the ship sinks. Furthermore. in his capacity of United States Secretary of
State, he must be the last
man to say that it is sinking, lest he be accused
7
of wishing it to do so.1

The attitude of the United States towards the problems of the United
Nations will have a profound effect on the future of the organization ...
The core of the world security problems is the relationship between the
East and the West .... The fact that in the short span of its existence, the

United Nations has not been able to solve this basic problem has profoundly
affected the thinking of many members of Congress ....The most likely
result of revision, under the present circumstances would he the destruction
of the United Nations.7 8
76. This would only apply to an executive act of the peculiar nature under discussion
in this paper. Other executive agreements have been held to have the force of law, and
one territorial court decision went so far as to say, in regard to a British-American agreement regarding the island of San Juan, that while it was not a "casting of the national
will into a firm and permanent condition of law," it was "some sort" of an expression of
the will of the people expressed through the political arm of the government. See Watts
v. U. S. 1 Wash. Terr. 288 at 294 (1870).

77.

CARNEY, AN APPEAL To REASON 11 (Chicago, 1946).

78. U. S. Department of State, "Strengthening the United Nations," reprinted from
the Department of State Bulletin (May 16, 1948), pub. 3159 (Washington, 1948), execsits
from statements by General Marshall and Ambassador Austin.
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Recently the Labour .Party of the United Kingdom issued a pamphlet
"An attempt to federate now," says this pamphlet, "would exaggerate
divisions, excite mutual fear, distrust, contempt, and jealousy and greatly
favour centrifugal tendencies." 73
...

Examples could be multiplied of the thesis that changes must not be
made in the existing order because the only alternative available would be
no order, which presumably is even less order than we have now. Trapped in
this logic of their own making, diplomats are powerless in actual practice
to deliver themselves or their people from it.
Since the forms of government areso iitcomplete and rudimentary at the
world level, the only authorized procedure for changing the form is one in
which the sovereign people participate not at all. It is for this fundamental
reason that governmental negotiators find themselves in the squirrel-cage
of treaty-negotiation, ratification, dissatisfaction and breach or disregard of
the provisions thereof. Never are they able, by themselves, to rise to the fount
of power, to create true world law. Thus'fiom a purely formal and legal point
of view, the procedures authorized by the Charter of the United Nations do
not authorize the people of the world to ratify a world constitution. Articles
108 and 109 of the Charter provide for ratification of changes made by the
representatives of national governments" by the constitutional processes of the
Member States. Since the changes made in the United Nations Charter must
be in the form of treaties, and since in most countries treaty-making procedure does not require submission for approvalto the people, the validity of
his procedure in changing the Charter into a real world constitution and
establishing a government of delegated powers rather than an administrative
agency like the present United Nations organization is subject to much doubtSG
So far as the United States is concerned, such a treaty could not be considered
an act of the people, but only an act of the people's agent in foreign affairs,
the national government. An agent may not re-delegate powers given him by
his principal without first gaining the latter's consent. The treaty-making
procedure does not provide for securing such consent. The most that it can
be considered to achieve is the consent of two-thirds of the states of the
Union, through the representatives of the states in the Senate.81
79. Quoted by Ambassador Austin in an address before the Vermont General Assembly, February 24, 1949. U. S. Department of State Press Release No. 555.
80. Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U, S. 378 at 400: "In its international relations the United
States is as competent as other nations to enter into such negotiations and to become a
party to such conventions without any disadvantages due to limitations of its sovereign
power, unless that limit is necessarily to be found to be imposed by its own Consqitution."
The Charter lends some color to the notion of its popular origin by beginning its
Preamble with the words, "We the peoples of the United Nations . . . have resolved to
combine our efforts . . ." but its ending snatches away whatever flush of life might have
accrued to the Charter: "Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled ... do hereby establish an international organization ...." One gets the
notion that at all costs the "peoples" must be kept from direct cQntact with each other.
Governments become intercessors.
81. The Federalist, No. 62, p. 402 and No. 64, pp. 421-422 (Washington, 1937). But
States have no competence at international law severally.
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In summary, then, it would seem that the proposals to direct the President
of the United States to instruct his diplomatic representatives in the United
Nations to place on the agenda of the General Assembly the question of a revision conference of the United Nations-at which he or his representatives
would work out amendments to the Charter which would make it a world
government when ratified by the constitutional processes of the Big Five and
34 of the other 58 States-are proposals which are beset with difficulties.
These difficulties are, first, that neither Congress nor the President has any
authority to negotiate a treaty changing the fundamental form of our nation's
government and re-delegating the most important powers of external
sovereignty to a world federation without securing the consent of the people,
but the express terms of the United Nations Charter provide that the
revisions shall be ratified according to "the constitutional processes" of the
Member States and thus forbid the submission of the changes to the people of
the United States. In the second place, national leaders, having a vested
interest in the maintenance of their own power, are the least appropriate
delegates to a revision conference of the United Nations whose purpose would
be to divest them of that power at least in the field of foreign relations. Third,
the past conduct of such negotiators at international conferences gives us
very little hope that their future conduct will be different. Fourth, that
international suspicion of the representatives of the governments of other
nations is at its peak in these days, and that therefore, their official moves
would be watched with psychopathic awareness.
The question to which we must therefore address ourselves is, must we
change our constitutional processes for the ratification of treaties? If this
be answered in the negative, we may still consider the desirability of amending
the constitutional provisions. If a given proposal is not in the nature of a
*'must" if it is not absolutely necessary. we should presumably avoid the
the exertion of taking that step, however. So that if we find that it is not
absolutely necessary to amend the constitutional processes of reaty-ratification,
we must then ask, "If National Governments, executives, or Congressmen
cannot negotiate the people of the United States into a world 'constitution,
without violating the provisions of the Constitution, and if an amendment of
the Constitution is not necessary, then how can the people become part of a
world commonwealth ?"
AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

ON

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

There are two ways of initiating amendments to the Constitution of the

United States. Only one has ever been used, though the other has been
tried.8 2 The first way to initiate an amendment to the Federal Constitution
82. See U. S. Senate, 71st Cong. 2d Sess., Federal Constitutional Conver..an,
Senate Document No. 78 (January 6, 1930).
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is for both the Senate and the House of Representatives to approve it by a
two-thirds vote. The other way is for the Legislatures of two thirds of the
states to apply to Congress to call a national convention, for the purpose of
considering amendments to the Constitution. The language of Article V is
mandatory: Congress "shall call a convention."
Congress has discretion as to the time, place and composition of the
convention and the method of electing delegates. Clearly Article V does
not grant Congress the power to limit the scope of the convention, nor
does it prohibit Congress frbm limiting the scope of the convention.3"
However, according to a well-established rule of constitutional construction, all powers not granted in the Constitution to Congress or necessary and
proper to the fulfillment and use of the powers expressly granted are denied.
The proposal for an American constitutional convention to revamp the
powers of the government to deal with foreign affairs is based oh the belief
that the national government at present cannot commit into the hands of a
world federation the powers to deal With inter-nation affairs, because of
constitutional limitations. The example of the French Constitution of 1946
which commits the French nation to limit its sovereignty on a reciprocal basis
if necessary for the organization and defense of peace is held before us.s4 The
postwar Italian constitution contains a similar provision."5
The text of request by state. legislatures to the Congress for the calling
of an American constitutional convention suggest that amendments to the
United States Constitution should "authorize the United States to negotiate
with other nations, subject to later ratification, a constitution of a world federal
government, open to all nations, with limited powers adequate to assure
peace." 86 If, however, the convention isconvened after a world constitution
has already been presented for American ratification, the resolution provides
that amendments necessary for ratification be considered instead. 87 Two years
ago a similar proposal was defeated in the Wisconsin General Assembly by
a margin of three votes." Florida, California, Maine and New Jersey legisla83. William B. Lloyd, Jr. Constitutiona Action for Peace, Human Events pamphlet
No. 24, p. 16 (Hinsdale, Illinois, 1947).
84. Preamble, French Constitution of 1946. See also. Albert Guerard, The French
Constitution, 1946, 1 COMMON CAUsE 45 (August, 1947).

85. English translation of text in U. S: Department of State, Documents and State
Papers, I (April, 1948), 46-63: "Italy consents; on conditions of parity with other states,
to limitations of sovereignty necessary to an order for assuring peace and justice a iong
the nations; it promotes and favors international organizations directed toward that end."

See also Gertrude S. Hooker, Constitutions in the Making: Italy 2 Common CAUSE 235
(January, 1949).
86. Conn. S. J. t, 15, pending since public hearings on March 23, 1949. See 74
World Government News 5 (May, 1949).
87. 72 World Government News 8 (March, .1949).
88. Joint Resolution No. 25A, 1947 Sessioits Wisconsin. March 26, 1947. The text
of this resolution was 'Resolved . ... that the legislature of the State of Wisconsin does
hereby make application to the Congress of the United States to call a Constitutional
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tures have already passed such a request for an American constitutional convention: the proposal has been approved by the House in North Carolina and
Iowa and by the Senate in Florida. and has been introduced in Utah, Connecticut and Minnesota.1 9
There is some confusion about the reason for attempting to call an
American constitutional convention rather than a world constitutional convention.
There is little doubt that tile President possesses the power and authority
to discuss and negotiate United States participation in a world government
subject to due ratification. However, for political and psychological reasons
it would unquestionably make successful negotiation of the transformation
of the UN into a world government more likely if our constitution were
amended expressly to grant the President such powers. Such action would
dispel all foreign and domestic doubts as to our constitutional capacity,
and even more, our political willingness, to enter a world governient.90
From the above quotation, it would appear that the device of requesting
a national constitutional convention is merely a psychological one or one
designed to educate the public or to put pressure upon the national government to take action which it has not so far undertaken. What is here proposed
is a constitutional amendment to enable the President to take action which
no one denies him the power to take at the present time, even before such
an amendment is passed. Such shadow-boxing is fit for timid souls. The
nere presence of an "enabling" amendment is no guarantee whatsoever that
the President will follow such a mandate-his powers are "plenary, delicate
and exclusive" according to Sutherland-and what is more crucial, is no
guarantee that such negotiations will result in anything more than past
negotiations have achieved.
But another reason is suggested by United World Federalists, the
American organization which is sponsoring the constitutional convention
proposal.
It is generally believed by constitutional authorities that actual entry
of the U. S. into a world government of any sort will require amendment
of our Constitution. One lawyer consulted by UWF on this matter
Convention for proposing such amendment or amendments to the foreign affairs provisions
of the Constitution as may be deemed necessary."

89. See Journal of the House of Representatives of Florida, May 10, 1949, pp. 498-99,
for text of Sen. Mem. 282 as amended. In California, A. J. R. 26 passed the Assembly
68-0 on March 24 and the Senate 22-12 on April 6, 1949. In Maine, a slightly modified
request was passed unanimously by the House on April 2 and the Senate on April 4. In
New Jersey, A. C. R. 17 was passed on March 31 by the Assembly unanimously and
by the Senate with one dissenting vote on April 8, 1949. See 74 World Government News

5 (May, 1949).
90. Foreign Affairs Research Council of United World Federalists, Inc., Political

Action Letter I, "Project to Amend Federal Constitution to Provide for United States

Participation inf Limited World Government, January 24, 1949" (Washington, l' 19)
(mimeo'd).
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unequivocally stated that it is his opinion that entry into a world government
would require amendment of our constitution.9'
No "constitutional authorities" are cited in the above quoted "political
action letter." And of course there are no precedents. If, however, we go
back to the favorite historical period of world federalists and inquire about
how many of the thirteen federating states then amended their constitutions
to enable them to join the Union, the answer, quite simply, is: None. Thirty
years after the Constitution went into effect Connecticut established its first
constitution, superseding a charter friom Charles 1I. The constitution required
state officers to swear to support the United States Constitution. No other
provision mentioned the Federal Constitution.
In 1792. Delaware's second constitution made the governor commanderin-chief of the army and navy of Delaware "except when they shall be called
into the service of the United States." No other provision mentioned the
Federal Constitution,
Georgia ratified the Federal Constitution in January. 1788 and it went
into elTect for Georgia and the eight other states when New Hampshire
ratified on June 21, 1788. In November of that same year. a convention met in
Georgia and proposed the state's second constitution. This constitution made
no mention of the United States or its existence as a government, but on
the contrary provided that the governor should be commander-in-chief of
the militia with no exceptions, or provisos about the jurisdiction of the
United States Government over them. The existence of the Federal Union
was first recognized inthe Georgia Constitution of 1798. ten years later.
Maryland in 1792 provided for separation of national and state offices
in different individuals-no person to be a holder of both state and national
office-by an amendment to its constitution of 1776.
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was in force until 1918. The
earliest amendments to this pre-Federal constitution were in 1821. Amendment VIII provided that no State officer should hold office under the United
States Government. Chapter IN' of the Massachusetts Constitution provided
for the election of delegates to the Continental Congress. So far as any state
action to cancel this provision is concerned, none was taken, even though
there was provision for a convention in 1795 ifdesired by tx;o-thirds of the
-voters for the purpose of amending the commonwealth's constitution.
Thorpe, compiler of these constitutional changes, says cryptically, though
perfectly adequately, of this provision of the constitution-which he placed
in brackets-'superseded by Art. I, Constitution United States." 92
In the Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions, incidentally,
appears a clause which is virtually analogous to the phrases appearing in the
91. Ibid., loc. cit.
92. 3 THORPE, THE
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1906 (Washington, 1909).
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French and Italian constitlti<il)s oil linitatioin (if sovereignty. and is only
slightly more genieral than that proposed at the present tinie hv Lnite]A World
Federalists for an Anerican con1stitutional amendment:
The people of this cornri(onwealth have the sole and exclusive right of
governing themselves, as a free. sovereign, and indepenn(let state : and do,
and forever hearafter shall, exercise and enjo' every power, jurisliction
delegated
and right, which is not, or may not hereafter 1)e. by them expressly
'3
to the United States of America, in Congress asseinled.
Needless to sax, it was never necessary to make any delegation of power to
the Continental Congress. Among its last official acts, completed in the
spirit of John the Baptist who heralded a greater than he, it naried the
date and place of meeting for the new Congress aid adjourned sine die.94
New Hampshire (1792), New York (1801), and Virginia (1830) in
their constitutional changes after the inception of lederal Constitution, made
no constitutional mention (f the United States Government, while New
Jersey (1844?. North Carolina (1835), 1'hode lsland (1842). and South
Carolina (1790) had provisions for disposal of the militia wihen not in the
service of the United States, or for separation of state and national offices or
for oaths of allegiance to both state and national governments. 9"
None of the states, with the possible exception (if Massachusetts and
New -aml)shire mentioned above, made any provision before the convention
in Philadelphia to make delegations of power possible. Hamilton was impeccahly correct in saying that the convention was "a body utterly unlnown to
their constitutions." 96
It was not necessary for the states to make any preliminary or any later
approval of the Constitution. In the first case. the convention was whollv without legal authority, being purely informally called together for the purpose
of making proposals, and therefore needed no sanction by state constitutions.
On the other hand, no later approval of the Constitution was necessary. for
a very simple reason. What the state ratifying conventions had agreed to on
behalf of the sovereign people in ratifying the United States Constitution was
an instrurlent which contained the phrase:
This Cemnstitntion . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithThing in 9 the
7
starding.
Tllonas Paine, writing in The Rights of Man, tells us:
0'. Id. at 1890.
14.
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WORLD GOVERNMENT
After the new federal Constitution was established, the state of
Pennsylvania, conceiving that some parts of its own constitution required
to be altered, elected a convention for that purpose. The proposed alterations
were published, and the people concurring therein, they were established. 98
An examination of the changes made by the people, however, revealed
that they were the minor ones of requiring that no member of the National
Congress should hold office in the state legislature and that the governor was
to be commander-in-chief of the militia unless when called into the actual
service of the United States. Neither of these changes was by way of "an
enabling" act. The Federal Constitution expressly provides that the President
shall be the commander-in-chief of the militia "when called into the actual
service of the United States," and so the related provision in the Pennsylvania
constitution was merely concerned with the command of the militia when not
under federal control. In no sense do these provisions enable or ratify the
changes which occurred, as the result of the ratification of the Federal Constitution, in their inter-state relationships. Further, the fact that they occurred
in only a few constitutions and then some y~ears later, shows that they are
of no help in providing a precedent for pre or post-world-constitutional action
by the United States unilaterally. Certainly such analogous action by the
United States today is not grasping at the heart of the matter, which is to
achieve, in some way, universal and binding action to establish world federation.
We may consider, as established, then, that national governments cannot
constitutionally involve the people of the United States in a world federation
without their consent; that they may, however, negotiate, but are extremely
unlikely to do so, or to do so effectively; that historical experience has been
that a constitutional amendment was not necessary, and was not necessary
because the constitutional proposal approved by the people in 1788 contained
the provision that it was the supreme law of the land and superseded contrary
provisions of the constitutions of the constituent political units.
We nust therefore turn our attention to a third line of action in an
attempt to answer the question: How may the people become part of a world
political commonwealth in a world already interdependent physically, economically, politically and culturally?
WORLD

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

The Declaration of Independence states in immortal phrases that:
Whenever atiy form of government becomes destructive of these
Ends (of life, liberty and the pursuit of. happiness), it is the right of the
people to alter or abolish it, and to institute ,new government, laying its
98. (New York: Modern Library ed. 1946) D. 214.
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foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.
Presumably this right to "alter or abolish" government extends to the
creation of government where none yet exists, on the world level."9 The
United States of America is in a unique position to share its knowledge and
experience of a practical technique of instituting new government with the rest
of the people of the world. This is the technique of the constitutional convention. There have been over 200 constitutional conventions held by the
states in the United States and one Federal Convention, although the United
States Constitution provides for the holding of other Federal Conventions
to amend the original Constitution. 0 0 Jefferson liked this method of altering
the fundamental law of the community because it provided for peaceable
revolution. He realized at the same time that it would strike terror into the
hearts of those who wanted no revolution, peaceful or otherwise. In the
midst of the most serious crisis our government has ever had to face, perhaps
not even excluding the Civil war, when our Constitution seemed about to be
unequal to the strains put upon it, he wrote, almost gleefully to Monroe:
They (the Federalists' party) were completely alarmed at the resource
for which we declared, to wit, a convention to reorganize the government
and to amend it. The very word convention gives them the horrors, as in
the present democratical spirit of America, they fear they should lose some
of the favorite morsels of the Constitution.' 0
When the crisis had successfully been passed, he wrote more soberly and
also more appreciatively, of the merits of the convention method, to Nathaniel
02
Niles:
... There was general alarm during the pending of the election in Congress, lest no President should be chosen, the government be dissolved, and
anarchy ensue. But the cool determination of the really patriotic to call
a convention in that case, which might be on the ground in eight weeks, and
wind up the machine again which had only run down, pointed out to my
mind a perpetual and peaceable 'resource against ... in whatever extremity
might befall us; and I am certain a convention would have commanded
immediate and universal obedience. ..
There are several questions which could be asked about the convention
approach to the drafting of a world constitution. For example,
99. It is the view of Quincy Wright and others that "world government exists now,
but not with sufficient centralization." The U. N. Charter as a World Constitution, 2
COMMON CAUSE 223 (January, 1949). It is his contention, therefore, that the emphasis
should be placed on "altering" by a gradual process the U. N. Charter to make it more

"centralized." See also his Constitution-Making as Process, I COMMON CAUSE 284
(February, 1948) and his letter on the Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution,
February 17, 1948, 2 COMMON CAUSE 63-65 (September, 1948).
100. O'ROURKE, CONSITUflON-MAKING IN A DnwocRAcy 23 (Baltimore,
101. 10 WITINGS or THOMAS JEFFERSON 201 (Memorial ed., 1903).

102. Id. at 233.
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(1) Would a world constitutional convention be legal?
(2) How should-or could-a world constitutional convention be initiated or called?
(3) What have been--and what should be-the size and character of
personnel of past and future constitutional conventions?
(4) What are the powers of a constitutional convention and can they
be limited in any way?
(5) How have constitutions been ratified-and how should they be
ratified-which have proceeded from constitutional conventions ?
(6) What are some current proposals for world constitutional conventions ?
For reasons of space we shall omit consideration of (3) and (5) and
consider (6) in connection with (2).
Would a world constitutional convention be legal? The point is too well
established to be labored that the American people have the right to change
their government at any time. The Declaration of Independence, abovementioned, while not a part of our law in the same sense that the Constitution
is, nevertheless states such fundamental principles of our legal philosophy
that it would be impossible to imagine a denial of them.
But the Federal Constitution itself contains the recognition that it is
an act of the Sovereign People of the United States,.and Amendments Nine
and Ten recognize that the Constitution establishes a government of limited
powers.
The natural construction of the Constitution is made absolutely certain
. . disclosed the widespread fear
that the national government might, under the pressure of a supposed
general welfare, attempt to exercise powers which had not been granted.
With equal determination, the framers intended that no such assumption
should ever find justification in the organic act, and that if, in the future,
further powers seemed necessary, they should be granted by the people....
The argument of counsel ignores the principal factor in this article (X),
to wit. 'the people." Its principal purpose was not the distribution of power
between the United States and the States, but a reservation to the people
of all powers not granted. . . . All powers of a national character which
are not delegated to the national government by the Constitution are
reserved to the people of the United States....
This article X is not to be shorn of its meaning by any narrow or
technical constru&ion, but it is to be considered fairly and liberally so as to
give effect to its scope and meaning.1 03

by the tenth amendment. This amendment

.

The truth of this holding is not derogated in the slightest by the opinion
in the case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation:
The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no
powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such
103. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907).
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implied powers as arc necessary and proper to carry into effect the

enmerated l)owers. is categorically true onl'
affairs.104

in respect oi our internal

Justice Sutherland's argument was concerned with the so-calle(l "twilight
zone" of powers uot specifically delegated to the Federal Government.by the

Constitution, yet denied to the states. This is clear from the statement immediately following the one just quoted:
In that field, the primary purpose of the Constitution was to carve
front the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the States
such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal government.
leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the states.
It is also clear fron his own words that he was not considering the
question of the division of powers between the Federal Government delegated
by the people and those remaining in the people. nor was he considering the
right of the people-rather than the states-to reclaim those powers in the
event they were needed., for in his Constin tional Power and W~orld Affairs,
he says:
When the Constitution was framed, therefore, the undivided powers of
external sovereignty were in the Union, which antedated the Constitution
and was made "more perfect" by it. Hence, the disposition of these powers
did not involve taking something from the mass of state power . . . for they
already belonged to the Nation, and the only question to be determined was,
What shall be given to the general government and made active, and what
shall be reserved to the people and lie dormant ? 105
As a practical matter, Sutherland could not conceive of a national government not having enough power to achieve the ends it has been formed to achieve.
Inasmuch as the powers of government nmust be commensurate with
the ends for which the government was instituted in order to assure attainnient, a presumption arises that every necessary power is conferred unless
prohibited. .-.

. The government was created and constituted as the sole

agency of the Nation in all its external relations, charged with the responsibility of preserving it and of maintaining its equality. For the accomplishment of these ends, it must be assumed as a necessary and self-evident
06
postulate, that no legitimate power would be intentionally withheld.'
This is simply the notion of external sovereignty-the belief that a
sovereign nation can exist which is absolutely unlimited in its power to deal
with foreign nations. What Sutherland did not do is make clear the distinction,
an absolutely crucial one, between authority and power. While it may be
true that the national government possesses full and exclusive authority to
114. 2 9 U. S. 304, 307 (1936).
105, Sutherland, op. cit. supra at p. 45.
Io . Ibid.
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deal with foreign affairs, it is not true that the national government, or even
the sovereign People of the United States, possesses power to preserve the
State against outside enemies or to maintain its equality. One may authorize
a blind man to review a motion picture though he is powerless to do so. One
may authorize a paralytic to drive his car. Or one may authorize his national
government to avoid war and seek peace. The belief in external sovereignty's
reality in the Atomic Era is the most vicious of social myths because the most
dangerous to the welfare and happiness of the American people. Sutherland
is right: "A political society cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere.
Sovereignty is never held in suspense." When therefore the external sovereignty
of Great Britain in respect of the Colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the
Union. But when we examine the case cited in defense of this statement, we
find that:
.. . these high acts of sovereignty were submitted to, acquiesced in and
approved of, by the people of America. In Congress were vested, because by
Congress were exercised with the approbation of the people, the rights of
war and peace ... .107
And in Justice Iredell's concurring opinion we find his conclusion to be
that :
Every particle of authority which originally resided either in Congress or
in any branch of the State governments, was derived from the people , , ,
that this authority was conveyed by each body politic separately, and not
by all the people in several provinces or states .jointly, and of course that
no authority could be conveyed to the whole but that which previously was
possessed by the several parts.105
Our constitutions are filled with references to the fact that government
is established by consent and compact of the people and that it is the right
of the people to alter or abolish it at will. For example:
All political power is vested in and derived from the people only.
(South Carolina Constitution, 1776, Preamble.)
All government of right originates from the people, is founded in compact only and instituted solely for the good of the whole. (North Carolina
Constitution, 1776, Art. I, Declaration of Rights.)
When any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these
purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and
indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be
judged most conducive to the public weal. (Maryland Constitution, 1776,
Art. I.)
Whenever these great ends of government are not obtained, the people
have a right, by common consent, to change it, and take such measures as to
them may appear necessary to promote their safety and happiness. .

..

The

community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform
alter or abolish government in such manner as shall be by that community
107. Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 Dallas 54, 80 (U. S. 1795),

108. Id. at 94.
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judged most conducive to the public weal. (Pennsylvania, 1776, Preamble
and Declaration of Rights, Art. V.)
Tile people, from whom all power originates and for whose benefit
all government is intended. .

.

. (Georgia Constitution, 1777, Preamble.)

It needed no reservation in the organic law to preserve to the people
their inherent power to change their government. (Elliughaln v. Dye. 178
Indiana 336 at 344 (1912).
From the above quotations it would seem clear that the powers held by
the national government are derived from the people, whether they be considered the people of the United States severally or the people of each state
separately.
Sutherland indeed does nowhere deny this. But it was his belief that
the power "inherent" in the national governmeit was there because it had
nowhere else to go. It could not go to a world government at that time for
the simple reason that none existed and besides the Thirteen States were
much more isolated from the rest of the world and less influenced by or
threatened by its pressures. It could not go to the people-it could not remnil in
the people because:
a power reserved to a hundred million drivers is in effect a power
which (foes not exist, since it cannot he translated into action until transferred
to the government by the 0long
tedious and almost inllossible process of
9
Constitutional amendment.
The upshot then would seem to be that the people have here a power to
divide their sovereignty, giving part to a world government, but it is a power
which is not actual until the people have acted, until they have used it.
Like the man who feels physically exhausted only to find that when lie
starts to run lie generates speed he thought himself incapable of the moment
before, the people have the right, whenever they will to use it, to alter or
abolish the powers they thought "inherent" in the national government and
transfer them to new government. But until they act, national governments
perforce must continue to stumble haltingly through the forests of international
anarchy filled with similarly incomplete national sovereignties each fearful
of the others. "Sovereignty is never held in suspense." It vests in those who
are willing and able to use it.
The limitations of the Constitution are not bonds which fetter the
people; they are restraints imposed by the people themselves upon the government which they have created as an instrumentality through which they
rule in order that their creature may never forget that it has a creator.1 0 "
The device of the constitutional, convention is one technique by which
the people may exercise their sovereigrnty.
109. Sutherland, op. cit., p. 42.

110. Id. at 11.
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Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient accuracy
our political systems, would answer that, in our governments, the supreme
power is vested in the constitutions. This opinion approaches a step nearer
to the truth, but does not reach it. The truth is, that in our governments the
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our
constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our
constitutions. Indeed, the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater;
and here James Wilson, author of these words, goes beyond Sutherland in
alleging that the sovereign power of the people, far from being "in effect a
power which does not exist," is effective when held by the people and can
be exercised by them for the people possess over our constitutions control
it act, as well as right. The consequence is, that the people may change the
constitutions whenever and however they please. This is a right of which no
positive institution can ever deprive them.
And recalling to his audience that they are members of the Pennsylvania
convention elected by the people for the purpose of approving or disapproving
the new Federal Constitution, Wilson emphasizes that he is not merely spinning theory-he is talking about realities:
These important truths, sir, are far from being merely speculative. We
at this moment speak and deliberate under their immediate and benign influence. To the operation of these truths we are to ascribe the scene, hitherto
unparalleled, which America now exhibits to the world-a gentle, a peaceful,
a voluntary and deliberate transition from one constitution of government to
another. In other parts of the world, the idea of revolutions in government,
is, by a mournful and an indissoluble association, connected with the idea of'
wars, and all the calamities attendant upon wars. But happy experience
teaches us to view such revolutions in a very different light, to consider them
only as progressive steps in improving the knowledge of government, and
increasing the happiness of society and mankind.
Oft have I marked with silent pleasure and admiration, the force and
prevalence throughout the United States, of the principle that the supreme
poer resides in the people, and that the'y never part w4th it. It may be called
the panacea in politics. There can be no disorder in the community but may
not here receive a radical cure....
Are not these universal principles applicable no less to the world community? With what seems to this writer to be inexorable logic, Wilson went
on to draw the conclusion which may be applicable to present day affairs, as
lie thought it to be applicable to that earlier crisis:
When the principle is once settled that the people are the source of
authority, the consequence is, that they may take from the subordinate
governments powers with which they have hitherto trusted them, and place
those powers in the general government, if it is thought that there they will
he productive of more good. They can distribute one portion of power to the
more contracted circle, called state governments; they can also furnish
another proportion to the government of the United States. Who will under-
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take to say, as a state officer, that the people may not give to the general
government what powers and for what purposes they please How comes it,
sir, that these state governments dictate to their superiors-to the majesty
of the people? '

Why can they not furnish another portion to a third level of government,
a world government? Who will undertake to say, as a national leader, that
the people of his country may not give to a world government what powers
and for what purposes they please? How is it that these national governments
dictate to their superiors?
No, there is little doubt that the Constitution of the United States was

superimposed upon the various state constitutions without any authority
derived from state governments, and indeed in direct violation of the provisions
of the Articles of Confederation. Not only this, but it might have been legally
adopted by the people of the various states against the will of the various
State governments: 112
The assent of the States, in their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling
a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the
people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it, and their act was final.
It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the state
governments. The constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the state sovereignties.
It has been said that the people had already surrendered all their powers
to the state sovereignties, and had nothing more to give. But, surely, the
question, whether they may resume and modify the powers granted to
government, does not remain to be settled in this country.
Jefferson, in a long discussion of the case of Cohens v. Virginia, concluded: 113

The ultimate arbiter is the people of the Union, assembled by their
deputies in convention, at the call of Congress, or of two thirds of the states.
The origin of the idea of the convention method of establishing new forms
of government can not be ascertained with any degree of cei'tainty. In the
formation of the state governments of the Thirteen States, John Adams
declared that the people "must all be consulted, and we must realize the
theories of the wisest writers, and invite the people to erect the whole building with their own hands, upon the broadest foundation." t4 As early as1648 in England, according to one writer, a plan was drawn up embodying
the convention idea.
That some persons be chosen by the Army to represent the whole Body;
and that the well-affected in every County (if it may be) chuse some persons
to represent them ....

That those persons ought not to exercise any Legis-

lativ power, but onely to draw up the foundations of a just Government, and
111.
112.
113.
114.

2 ELLIoTT, D.BArcs, 432 ff. (Italics not in original.)
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
Letter to Judge William S. Johnson, 15 WRixiN(;s 451 (June 12, 1823).
3 JoHN ADAMS, WoRKs 46 (C. F. Adams ed.),
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to propound them to the well-affected people in every County -to be
agreed to; Which Agreement ought to be above Law .... n1
The origin of the idea has been credited by Hoar, at least in its perfect
embodiment to the town of Concord, Massachusetts. On October 21, 1776,
the town voted on the question of authorizing the legislature to frame a
constitution.
That the Supreme Legislative, either in their proper capacity, or in
Joint Committee, are by no means a body proper to form and establish a
t'onstitution or form of Government; for reasons following: first, because
we conceive that a Constitution in its proper idea intends a system of principles established to secure the subject, in the possession and enjoyment of
their rights and privileges, against any encroachments of the governing part,
second, because the same body that forms a constitution have of consequence
a power to alter it, third because a constitution alterable by the Supreme
Legislative is no security at all to the subject against any encroachment of
the governing part on any or on all of their rights and privileges.
Acordingly, they recommended the calling of a convention.l& The Massachusetts assembly resolved itself into a convention nevertheless and offered
a constitution. It was not accepted. The town of Concord cast 111 votes
against it and none in favor. 117
On the world level, there are three possible ways in which a constitutional convention might be considered legal. (1) A constitutional convention
might be considered legal if it were held in accordance with some previously
authorized procedure. (2) It might be proper if it were held, even though
without previous authorization, in such an orderly manner as to reflect the
will of the people. (3) It might be considered legal if it were held, without
previous authorization and in such a way as not to reflect the will of the
people, and its results or the constitution forthcoming. vindicated or legitimized
by force or by the passage of time, i.e., by passive acquiescence.
So far as the first method is concerned, the only previously authorized
procedure existent on the world level is that provided for in the United Nations
Charter. As we have seen, this method does not provide for ratification by
the procedures required by our system for changing our Constitution. The
treaty-making power does not include the power to change the fundamental
law of the land. Therefore, any attempt by American diplomats to bargain
away the authority granted solely and exclusively to them would be in plain
contravention of our constitutional theory and practice. Only if such an
attempt were acquiesced in by the people or forced on them by the might of
government could it be considered "legal." And this method would then
115. PEASE, TuE LEVELLER MOVEMENT 261. quoted in McLAUGHLIN, op. cit., p. 109.
116. HoAR, CONSTITUrIONAL CoNVENnONs 7 (Boston, 1918), quoting from the record

in 156 Mass. Archives, No. 182.
117. McLAUGHLIN, op. cit., pp. 110-111.
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partake of the characteristics of the third type of legitimation mentioned above,
rather than the first.
Delaying for a moment the consideration of the second possibility of
legality, let us consider briefly the third. It is possible that world government
might be established by the spontaneous act of an unrepresentative part of the
people of the world, acting without previous authority. Such world government would be tantamount to revolution. It was in this way that most of the
state governments of the thirteen colonies were established.
The convention of Virginia had not the shadow of a legal, or a
constitutional form about it. It derived its existence and authority from a
higher source; a power which can supersede all law, and annul the constitution itself-namely, the people, in their sovereign, unlimited, and unlimitable
authority and capacity. 1 8
World government established by such a method takes its legality basically
from the fact of force. It is judged by its success rather than by the means
used. It is to be distinguished on this basis from conventions which attempt to
use more orthodox methods. It is on this basis that "Dorr's Rebellion" failed
in Rhode Island in 1841. Such spontaneous acts have no really legal authority,
even when supported by a majority of the persons in the community or even
by a majority of the voters.
Suppose a constitution formed by a volunteer convention, assuming to
represent the people, and an attempt to set it up and displace the existing
lawful government. It is clear that neither the people as a whole nor the
government having given their assent in any binding form, the executive,
judiciary and all officers sworn to support the existing constitution, would
be bound, in maintenance of the lawfully-existing institutions of the people,
to resist the usurpation, even to the whole extent of the force of the state.
If overpowered, the new government would be established by actual
revolution." 9
On the other hand, we have several examples in the history of the states
of the United States of just such volunteer conventions establishing constitutions or at least meeting to establish them. Even though thus illegally instituted, their actions were ratified by time or events. We have already
mentioned the experience of the original 13 states. In addition, several of the
seceded Southern states had factions within them which attempted to set up
120
governments supported by Union armed force.
118. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. 20, 74 (1793).
119. Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 48-49 (1875).
120. For example in 1848 in California, the citizens, becoming impatient of action
admitting California as a state, met in several towns "for the purpose of taking into
consideration the propriety of establishing a provincial territorial government for
the better protection of life and property" until Congress should provide a government.
They adopted resolutions calling for a constitutional convention, setting a place and
time. Then when Congress adjourned without taking action, the military governo- of

California hastened to issue his own call for a convention, but;"the, people were inclined
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Our own Federal Convention, while authorized by the states, was not
provided for in their constitutions nor in the Articles of Confederation, and
its action as we have seen was of a completely unauthorized nature. However,
its defects were cured by ratification by the people.' 21
Other examples are of constitutional conventions called and organized
spontaneously which did not receive the support of the authorities or of the
people in a regular manner and thus failed. "Dorr's Rebellion- was the result
of one of these unsuccessful efforts. Rhode Island had continued after the
R evolution and the establishment of the United States of America under its
original charter from King James, which provided for an exceedingly limited
siffrage of landholding white males. Agitation for the reform of this royal
charter had started as early as 1820. An informal unauthorized convention was
held in Rhode Island in 1837, but took no action, for the legislature made some
reforms or at least promised them. In January. 1840, pamphlets were distributed in the towns urging the people of each
. . to hold primary meetings, call a State Convention, elect delegates and
append to the credentials of each member a list of the voters. The Convention
S.. should canvass the votes and if the whole number cast was greater than
at the last general election for members of Congress, then the Convention
was to consider itself the representative of a majority of the people and
fully authorized to frame a Constitution. Under the Constitution so made,
members of Congress were to be elected who should go to Washington and
claim seats in the House of Representatives, which would thus be forced
to decide
whether the old Royal Charter government was in the republican form guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. This was the plan. In response to this
I)amphlet and the organizing ability of Thomas W. Dorr, a young lawyer of
Rhode Island who had led the struggle for a broader electorate, a mass meeting
of 3.000 people was held in April, 1841, and a convention was called for
October. The delegates met, drew up a constitution, and submitted it to the
people-i.e., those qualified to vote under it! but more than just to the
existing electorate-dninterfered with by the existing government. Fourteen
to dispute the authority of General Riley. The difficulty was adjusted by the local organications changing the date of their proposed convention to the date fixed by General
Riley in his proclamation." MASON, HIsToRY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CALIFORNIA,
in CALIFORNIA, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 360-368 (Sacramento, 1945).

A convention wholly unauthorized by the Constitution oi 1836 met in 1861 in Little

Rock, Arkansas, passed an ordinance of secession and made the appropriate changes in

the 1836 Constitution. These amendments were not submitted to the people, nor apparently

to the legislature. On January 4, 1864, under the protection of United States troops, a
mass convention of the people met at Little Rock and proposed a constitution to the

people. It was ratified by the suspiciously totalitarian vote of 12,177 to 266. It declared the
1861 Constitution to be null and void. It provided only for legislative amendment, no con-

stitutional conventions being permitted. This constitution was superseded by that of 1868,
drafted by a constitutional convention under the reconstruction acts of Congress and
approved by 28.000 for and 26,500 against. I THoRPE, op. cit. supra at 277, 288, 306.
121. THE FEDERALIST, No. 40; 2 ELLIO'i, -DEBATES 432-433, 443-444.
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thousand people voted in favor of the Constitution, a clear majority of the
voters then eligible to vote and registered as such. It was said that the
regular electorate boycotted the polls on the election day, however. When
the Constitution was to be put into effect and officers elected under it attempted
to take office, they were resisted successfully by the incumbent government
by force of arms. A convention hurriedly authorized by the regular legislature
then drew up a constitution which embodied a good many revisions of the
old Royal Charter, on which less than half of the registered electorate voted
approval, chiefly because they did not like the idea of sharing their voting
privileges with the great unwashed masses of mechanics and laborers in the
towns. But this constitution became effective, while the "People's Constitution" did not.'2
Apparently the only difference in their validity was this: that the
minority who approved the second constitution had voted at a duly called
election, and hence had authority to speak for the, whole people; whereas, the
14,000 who voted for the "People's Convention" had voted at an irregular
2
election, and hence spoke only for themselves.'1
The case of Luther v. Borden, although decided on other grounds, went
into the validity of the latter constitution, the Court saying:
When-it is necessary to ascertain the will of the people, the legislature
must provide the means of ascertaining it .... There must be an authentic
mode of ascertaining the public will somehow and somewhere.
If not, it is
24
a government of the strongest and most numerous.'
The fundamental distinction which we are trying to make here is that
so far as our laws and customs are concerned, a "spontaneous" convention is
one which is not organized "through channels" while a "popular" convention
is one which, though not specifically authorized, and perhaps specifically
prohibited by legislative act and constitution prior, is nevertheless proposed,
organized and held under "official" auspices and "through channels," and
thus gains a measure of validity which does not depend on force or acquies1,
cence.
This distinction has been brought into the current argument concerning
proposals for world constitutional conventions in the proposals for "unofficial" and "official" conventions. As a matter of fact, however, there has been
no simon-pure proposal for a completely "unofficial" world constitutional
convention. That is to say, all of the various proposals put forth have contem122. 10 J. B. MACMAsrR, A HIsToRY or THE AMvilIcAN
123. K. S. HonA, CoN sUTIONAL CONVENTiOSS, THEIR

PEOPLE 166-78 (1910).
NATURE, POWERS AND

LIMITAnONS 21-22 (1917).

124. 7 HowA

1, 31-32 (U.S. 1849).

125. Hoar's formal definition of a popular convention is "one which is held in an

orderly manner such as to represent clearly the popular will, and yet which is not expressly authorized by the existing constitution." HOAR, op. cit.
supra note 117, at 38 -f
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plated welcoming the assistance of national governments where possible, while
declaring determination to proceed without the official sanction of national
governments where necessary or where it is not forthcoming.
The plan which has received the most publicity is that sponsored by
Henry Usborne, British member of Parliament and Secretary of the Parlianientary Committee which has initiated the "Crusade for World Government."

lit even his proposal does not contemplate the establishment of a world
26
goveruntent without ratification by existing national legislatures.
The onlh plan which has come to the attention of this writer which
envisages not on] "vunofficial"
convening of a world constitutional convention
lut also. if necessary, the ratification of any constitution drafted by this
convention bv "unofficial" procedures is one sponsored by a group calling
itself "The Peace Builders" with headquarters in Chicago, Illinois. This
group has circulated a 'mandate for a people's world constituent assembly"
which provides for official or unofficial calling of a world constituent assembly to
draft a world constitution and submission "to the governments and people

of all countries for ratification." 127.
One writer has cautioned, however, that. so far as the calling or initiation
of a world constitutional convention is concerned, there should be a conscious
and positive attempt to avoid receiving official status from any government.
This is on the theory that the broad appeal of a popularly initiated convention
would dispel the distrust of the people of one nation for the governments of
other nations.
We must not allow world government to be taken u I) at this stage by
our State Department as an official American idea. United World Federalists
(the largest American membership organization) is in danger of doing just
that in its attempt to put pressure on the government to act officially in
proposing federation through the U. N. amendment procedure. The only
result of such a successful top-level sales job that we can conceive is that
the State Department might take up world government slogans as a popular
aod useful means of driving Russia out of the U. N. and building a grand
alliance around America. We must honestly admit that world government
could'be an effective cloak for such an action. It would probably be fatal to
our idea and lead to that very dissolution of the U. N. and the opening of
the hostilities that we dread.
Even if our government sincerely adopted world government, the
Russian-American vicious circle has reached a point where any proposal by
one side must be opposed for face-saving reasons by the other. This is not,
the time for the U. S. Government to precipitate the situation over the
federalist idea.
He therefore proposes an entirely unofficial campaign in this country
126. See Usborne, The Crusade for WVorld Government, 3

BULLETIN OF TItE ATo.Mic

359-360 (1947); Mayer, A People's Il'orld Constiltent Assemtbly, id. at 361362; Usborne, The 1950 Contention; Unofficial or Sozereign, 1 COMMON CAUSE 123124 (1947).
127. Mandate for a Peoples' World Contstituient Assembly, .Mandate Committee (1947).
SCIENTISTS
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presumably paralleling efforts in other free countries to enroll the support
of "at least ten million voters," through non-governmental channels.
In the years before the election, federalists will need to enroll the support
of the major sympathetic civic and political organizations, find the hundreds
of leaders willing to stand as candidates and participate in the educational
debates, build an organization of several hundred thousand workers along
election district lines, and canvass the population in a registration drive for
ten million pledged voters ....
The essence of the Convention campaign is
the nationwide debate on issues by128the candidates and a popular unofficial
election of delegates by the people
Another discussion of the popular election of delegates to a world constitutional convention indicates, however, that official support would be
accepted.
The election would be unofficial, though some states might be persuaded
to lend official state election machinery for this purpose. Or, in some 22
states, the referendum could be used to compel states to cooperate in the
election of delegates. .

.

. In some states-provided the laws and election

practices of the state were 'not discriminatory-the official state election
machinery might be used in order to minimize costs and obtain a large
voter participation. The aim, in either an official or unofficial state election,
should be for at least one-fourth of those who voted in the last national
election, or approximatey 12,000,000 people, to participate in the ballot.
Where the election was authorized
by the state, regular state registration
129
rules would have to be followed.
The Pocono Pines Conference on World Government, held in May, 1948,
discussed the problem of "official" versus "unofficial" election of delegates
to a world convention, and one of the participants wrote:
It is quite certain, however, that regular political channels will, to
a large extent, be avoided, since this would tend to controvert the underlying theory of the plan: that peoples, not governments, are the only legitimate
instruments for the execution of this job. This does not, of course, mean
that we will not solicit a certain amount of advice and participation from
those who are already active politically.1 0
In summary, then, none of the plans being considered by American
advocates of world federal government, contemplates, as a matter of principle,
the refusal of offers to put state election machinery at their disposal, although
there is some opinion that ihis would be advisable in order to encourage the
participation of the people of all nations in such a world constitutional convention.
128. WOFFORD, CROSSROADS FOR FEDERALISTS, 11, 15, 16 (Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Chapter, United World Federalists, n.d.) Mr. Wofford was the founder of
the Student Federalist movement in the U. S. A.
129. Dancer, Campaign for a People's World Convention 5, 12,
WORLD GOVERNMENT (1948).
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130. Letter, July 1, 1948, from Stephen Benedict, Member of the National Executive
Council, United World Federalists, to the writer.
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Since none of the proposals now extant contemplate exclusive popular
action both at the convention-calling stage and the constitution-ratifying stage,
none fall into the category of "spontaneous". or "unofficial" or "revolutionary'
proposals. We may therefore consider at this point the third possible method
of legitimizing the establishment of world government, that is through the
"popular" or "official" approach to the problem. 1
We may define a "popular convention" as one which is held in such an
orderly manner as clearly to represent the popular will, and yet one which
is not expressly authorized or effectually prohibited .by whatever world constitutional enactments are extant (and there are none).1SZ
According to this definition, therefore, any world constitutional convention hoping to achieve official status must rely for its validity on the
methods by which it is brought into being and organized, since it rests on
the legally unquestionable right of the people of the world to bestow their
sovereignty on whatsoever agencies of government are best able to provide
for their safety and happiness. We must go on, then, to the second question of
the method by which the voice and will of the sovereign people are organized
and heard and felt. For depending on whether the method is fairly representative of the people of the world or whether it is a mere unofficial group of
citizens purporting to act for the whole, it may be characterized as "popular"
or "official" and therefore legal, or "spontaneous" ("unofficial") and therefore
legitimate only to the extent that it becomes de facto accepted.
The second question, then, one on which the answer to the first depends,
is: How should a World constitutional convention be called?
We have two types of historical precedent to guide us in this inquiry.
The first is the experience of the Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787.
This was a convention which had not, been provided for in the Articles of
Confederation, nor in any of the state constitutions. The second type of historical precedent arises from the experience of those states of the Union whose
constitutions did not or do not provide for amendment, or which provide for
amendment by some other means than the convention method. In both of
these types of precedent, it is to be noted that there 'was no positive legal
authority for the calling of a constitutional convention. There were no instructions as to what political institution was to be responsible for initiatory
measures. We, the Founding Fathers, and the people living under this type
of constitution were and are in the dark as to appropriate procedure to
establish new government.
We have examined above in detail the nature of the precedent furnished
us by the experience of the Federal Convention. It was, in short, a precedent
131. The first method, discussed supra, was that of diplomatic revision of the United
Nations Charter through the treaty-making procedure. This, it was concluded, would
be contrary to the American constitution, both in 'theory and in practice.
132. HOAR, op. cit. supra note 117, at 38.
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authorizing the national legislature of any national state to initiate conferences
for the purpose of "discussing" international relations, and to appoiut
delegates to represent the nation at such conferences.
Former Justice Owen J. Roberts made an analogous proposal recently
before a congressional committee. the only difference being that, where all
thirteen states had been invited both to the Annapolis Convention and the
Philadelphia convention-not merely tile slave-holding or non-slave-holding
states-Justice Roberts would invite only the "democratic" nations (i.e.,
those which had had some experience in "self-government" such as the Union
of South Africa in which a million or fewer Dutch and British invaders rule
eight million natives and imported East Indians who are deprived of the franchise and all civil rights as well) :
If I were the Congress of the United States. I would adopt a resolution
inviting the delegates from the members of the British Comnonwealth . . .
France. Belgium, the Netherlands. the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland . . . let us get together and see if we can form a union, a union something on the pattern of tile United States of America. . . . If tile delegates
could devise something . . . and would refer it back to the Congress. the

Congress would examine it, and theni refer it to tile people for a referendum
and the people of other nations would vote on it by popular vote ...
Mrs. BOLTON. You are simlply calling this group together to devise
something?
Mr. ROBERTS. Yes to see if they can devise something. The great
thing about my proposition is that it commits nobody to anything. It does
just wh.t the States did in 1787. The- said, "Let us choose wise men." I
would, for example. choose four from the House. four from the Senate,
eight from the conunity at large for our delegates, to meet with similar

delegates from other nations to explore if this thing is practical and can be
done, and report back what they find.
Mrs. BOLTON. To whom would they report back?
Mr. ROBERTS. To the Congress: and then the Congress would submit it to the people for ratification ....

133

Although we shall give only cursory attention to question f5). that of
ratification, it might be t)ertiient to note that Roberts would not specify the
exact technique of ratification, although it is known that he has supported
the pro)osal for all American constitutional convention, which litight be used
for the purpose of ratifying a world constitution submitted to itY1"
Exactly one-fourth of the states fail to make provision for the calling
of constitutional conventions, and in these there is often a question as to
whether the legislature alone can call a convention. These states are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana. Louisiana, 'Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas aitrl Vernmnt.
Two of the states. Georgia and Maine, provide that conventions may be
133. Structure of UN, Hearings, pp. 312-13, 328.
134. WM.

13.LLOYD,

JR., CoxsTIuTox,\. ACTION FOR PEAcz 24 (1947).
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called by the legislature alone, while in all the others a vote of the people is
required on the question of whether to have a convention. Only in Oregon
is it possible to initiate a convention by petition, and even here, of course,
some provision must be made by the legislature to execute.
The new constitution of Missouri approved at a special election in 1945
provided in detail for the calling of a constitutional convention automatically
evfry twenty years, with no intervention- by the legislature whatsoever. It
follows in many respects, though being more detailed, the corresponding
provisions of the Model State Constitution, published by the National Muni5
cipal League.13
We have an array of precedents to choose from, therefore, ranging from
the provisions of positive law to the trial-and-error experiments of states
having no guide except common sense and the practical limitations of. their
time and social and political environment.
Since we do not have in this country a popular initiative-only twentytwo states do-it would seem almost inevitable that some action must be
taken by official legislative bodies, to get the ball rolling toward the convocation of a constitutional assembly for the world.
However, it has been found necessary to stimulate by the processes of
political pressure and agitation the legislatures of this country, both state and
136
national.
Hoar says that all conventions are valid if called by the people speaking
through the electorate at a regular (or authorized) election. This is true, he
says, regardless of whether the constitution (if one exists prior to the convention) attempts to prohibit or to authorize them or is merely silent on the
subject. Their validity rests not upon constitutional provisions nor upon
legislative acts, but upon the fundamental sovereignty of the people themselves. 18 7
It would seem, therefore, that legislatures do not have the right, of and
by themselves, to proceed with the calling of a convention unless they receive
authority directly from the people. Proceeding on this assumption, Assemblyman Orlo Brees of the State of New York introduced a resolution on February 3, 1949, providing for the submission to the voters of the question,
"Shall the people of the United States take the initiative in calling a world
135. GR&vEs, AmEmicAN STATE GOVERNMENT 80, 81, appendix 905-906 (1941).
136. After the failure of colonial parliaments in Australia to act in 1891 to call a
convention, "Henry Parkes suggested a different method of attacking the problem.

Federation, he said, was a thing which concerned the Australian people as a whole;

therefore let them take it out of the hands oi parliameits, who seemed unable to bring the
matter to a conclusion. Let the people elect anothet convention, which would draw up
a Constitution for all Australia. The suggestion was opportune." By 1900, all of the
Australian nations had joined the federation. The idea had been dragging for 40 years
previously. F. L. WooD, CONSTITUTIOilAL DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIA 215-222 (1933).
137. HoAR, op. cit., supra note 117 at 52; see In re Opinion to the Governor, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 178 An. 433, 451-452 (R. 1. 1935).
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convention in 1950, for the formulation of a world federal constitution to be
submitted to the people of the participating nations for ratification?" "I
However, the significant point to renember is that at some point in the
proceedings, the legislatures must step in, either to provide for the election
of delegates by the people, or to take official action appointing the delegates.
Most of the states have been timid about calling unauthorized conventions
without the express approval of the people, although there are numerous
examples of legislatures which have acted without first getting consent from
the people. In the cases, where viable constitutions have come from them, it
is only because the people have ratified the finished product or because it
has been imposed on the people without getting their consent.
At one time in the early history of the country the view was entertained
that the people could legally assemble in convention and revise their constitution without the sanction of the legislature. but this doctrine is no longer
recognized. 13 9
On the other hand, the tirinciple is mightily striven for that the legislature is merely the instrument by which the people exercise their constitutional
or supra-constitutional right to change their constitutions.
When a law becomes the instrumental process of amendment it is not
because the legislature. possesses any inherent power to change the. existing
constitution through a convention, but because it is the only means through
which an authorized consent of the whole people, the entire state. can be
lawfully obtained in a state of peace .-.

. If the legislature, po.sessing

these powers of government, le unwilling to take the sense of the people,...
the remedy is still in their own hands: they can elect new representatives that
will .... The people required the law as the act of the existing government,
to which they had appealed under the Bill of Rights, to furnish theni legal
process to raise a convention, for revision of their fundamental compact,
and without which legal process the act of no one man could bind another.' 4
Judge Jameson, in his monumental work on Constitutional Conventions remarked concisely on this decision : Admitting the competency of the people
to call conventions, it would be impracticable, except through legislative
interposition. 4 '

Whether in the United States'it should he the national Congress or the
legislatures of the states which should take appropriate action to provide for
the election of delegates to a world Constituent assembly is a question more of
138. Passed the New York State Assembly on March 31, but not reported out for
passage in the Senate. Brees said, "If the people of a State approved the calling of a
constitutional convention that would carry with it a mandate to provide for representation
in such a convention, or at least it would overcome the objections of the 'die-hards' to
submitting the proposition of representation in such a convention to the people. Delegates

might either be elected or appointed by the Legislature." Letter to writer, April 27, 1949.
139. 6 R. C. L. 27.
140. Wells v. Bain 75 Pa. 39 at 47-48 (1872).
141. JAMESox,
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convenience than of law. A powerful factor operating to place the power in
the hands of the state legislatures is that the procedure of elections of national
representatives is and always has been within the jurisdiction of the states.
But the constitutional provision also states that "Congress may at any time
by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing
senators." The question of course may be raised as to whether the right- of
Congress to regulate the times, places and manner of holding elections for
senators and representatives includes the right to do the same for delegates to
a world constitutional convention, or whether one may logically imply such a
right or power. No popular national election has ever been held by the Federal
Government, although, of course, state elections of senators and representa42
tives have been regulated.'
In McCutloch v. Maryland, Justice Marshall pointed out that the natural
manner for the people to act in ratifying the Federal Constitution-and why
not in electing delegates to a world constitutional convention ?7-was for them
to act in their states.
They acted upon it, in the only manner in which they can act safely,
effectively and wisely on such a subject, by assembling in convention. It is
true, they assembled in their several states; and where else should they have
assembled ? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking
down the lines which separate the states, and of compounding the American
people into one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in
their states.143
And the opinion of Justice Iredell in Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators
goes into detail on the procedure necessarily followed by the people in the
States in setting up the Continental Congress:
I conclude, therefore that every particle of authority which originally
resided in Congress or in any branch of the state governments, was derived
142. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 1; § 3, cl. 1; AMEND. XVII (provide for election
"by the people" and determination of the qualification of electors by reference to the
qualifications "requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.")
See also discussion in Tim FF..IEXALIST, Nos. 59-61 at 383-400 (Sesquicentennial ed.

1937). Hamilton declared that the provisions for Congressional regulation of elections
rested on the principle that "every government ought to contain in itself the means of its
own preservation." "It will not be alleged," he said, "that an election law could have been
framed and inserted in the Constitution, which would have been always applicable to every
probable change in the situation of the country; and it will not therefore be denied that
a discretionary power over elections ought to exist somewhere . . . there were only three
ways in which this power could have been reasonably modified and disposed: that it
must either have been lodged wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State
legislatures, or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former. The last mode has,
Suppose an article had been introduced
with reason, been preferred by the convention ....
into the Constitution, empowering the United States to'regulate the elections for the
particular States, would any man have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable
transposition of power, and as a premeditated engine for the destruction of the State
governments ?"
For example of federal regulatory legislation, see Corrupt Practices Act, 43 STAT.
1070 (1925), 2 U. S. C. A. § 251 (1946).
143. 4 Wheat. 316, 403 (U. S. 1819).

AIItlI LAWl' QUARTERLY
from the people . that this atuthority was conveyed by each body politic
separately, and not 1y all the people in the several provinces or states jointly,
and of course, that no authority could be conveyed to 44the whole but that
which previously was possessed by the several parts.
Certainly it would not be permissible for the Congress of the United States
to act without referring to the people for authority, in the important matter
of establishing a world federation.
The powers delegated to the State sovereignties were to be exercised
by themselves, not by a distinct and independent sovereignty created by

themselves. To the fornation of a league, such as was the Confederation
the state sovereignties were certainly competent. But, when "in order to
form a more perfect union" it was deemed necessary to change this alliance
into an effective government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and
acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people,
and of145deriving its power directly from them, was felt and acknowledged
by all.
In view of the fact that the national Congress would naturally be reticent
to part with whatever power it has in the realii of foreign affairs, the argument
that the state legislatures, which have no vested interest in them, but which
are much closer to the people and which do have the power to provide for
elections, ought to provide for the election of delegates to a world constitutional
convention, takes on greater weight on purely pragmatic grounds.
The legislature of the State of Tennessee has already passed favorably
on legislation designed to enable the people of that state to participate in
electing national delegates to a world constitutional convention, and similar
legislation is pending in the State of Pennsylvania. Presumably this legislation
would receive validation by the people of these states in the act of voting for
delegates to such a convention. Although it might be argued that national
delegates to such a convention, having been authorized by popular vote,
would have full power to ratify any world constitution forthcoming on behalf
of the people of the United States, the Tennessee legislation provides for an
order to the national Congress directing it to call an American constitutional
convention for the purpose of ratifying a world constitution after it has been
presented by the world constituent assembly.16
144. 3 Dallas 54, 94 (U. S. 1795).
145. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 404 (U. S. 1819).
146. Because the Tennessee legislation goes further than any other current proposals
in taking the practical steps necessary to secure an actual popularly approved world
federation, the essential parts of the model for it are reproduced below.
Sec. 1. An election for the purpose 6f electing delegates to the World Constituent
, 1949.
day of
Assembly shall be held in this state on the
2. At such election any citizen of this state who has legally qualified to vote at the
election of presidential electors held on November 2, 1948, and in addition all citizens
becoming so qualified after the 1948 presidential election shall be entitled to vote in the
precinct or civil district in which he or she was then or would have been entitled to w te.
3. Said election shall be held at all ihe precincts or voting places established by hw
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Similar legislation introduced in the General Assembly of Pennsylvania
provides for the indirect election of delegates to the World Constituent Assembly to be held in Geneva, Switzerland in the winter of 1950. Ten delegates
(figured on a basis of one per million population) are to be elected by an
Electoral Assembly of fifty electors, nominated by petition having at least
500 names and elected by the voters of each Senatorial District in Pennsylvania.

and shall be managed and conducted under the laws then in force in the same manner
and under the same rules and regulations governing presidential elections.
The Commissioners of Elections and other proper officers under the law in the
various counties of this state shall advertise the time and place for holding such election,
as in the case of other special elections. The payment of a poll tax shall not be required
as a condition to the right to vote in said election.
4. The number of delegates to the World Constituent Assembly to be elected by the
[figured on the basis of one delegate per million
voters of this state shall be
population.] Candidates for the office of delegates shall be nominated and elected from
the state at large. Any citizen of the state entitled to vote in the elecion of delegates may
delegates.
vote for not more than 5. Candidates for the office of delegate to the World Constituent Assembly shall
be under the restriction prescribed by the Constitution of the United States for presidential
electors, i.e., that no Senator or Representative or person holding any office of trust or
profit under the United States shall be a delegate.
6. Nominations for candidates to the office of delegates shall be by petition signed by
no fewer than 500 citizens of this state entitled to vote in the election, which petition
shall be filed with the Secretary of the State Board of Elections not later than 30 days
prior to the election of delegates. The State Board of Elections shall immediately certify
the names of candidates or nominees to be printed on the ballots.
7. [Provides for blanks on the ballots for write-in candidates. This provision was
not included in the Pennsylvania bill, mentioned above.]
candidates
8. . . . The Governor and Secretary of State shall furnish to the receiving the highest number of votes, certificates of election as provided by law in the
candidates so furnished certificates of
case of presidential electors. The said election shall be delegates to the World Constituent Assembly, along with the delegates
similarly elected in the other states and the District of Columbia. [This sentence was
revised in the Tennessee legislation to meet the queries of those who wanted to make
clear that the delegates were to be representing the people of the Nation rather than the
State of Tennessee merely : "The said three candidates so furnished certificates of election
shall be delegates to the World Constituent Assembly, and, along with the delegates
similarly elected in the other states and the District of Columbia, shall compose the
national delegation representing the people of the United States at said Assembly for
the purpose of participating in the drafting of a world constitution to be submitted to
the people of the nations of the world for ratification."]
9. The delegates duly accredited from this state, as above provided, shall be paid
the same salary as United States Senators and in addition travel expenses to and from
all sessions of the Assembly and reasonable overseas living expenses, befitting their
official capacity, together with necessary expenses of communication, stenographic Ind
clerical and interpretorial assistance; and there is hereby appropriated from the general
to apply on the cost of the Assembly itself.
funds of the State all such sums plus $10. When the World Constitution has been drafted it shall be transmitted to the
Congress of the United States to be submitted to the people for ratification at a truly
representative Convention and application is hereby made to the Congress to promptly
thereafter call such Convention to meet at the earliest practicable date; the delepates to
be elected on a proportionate basis by the people of the respective states, to be subject to
limitation that no Senator or Representative or person holding an office of trust or profit
under the United States shall be a delegate; in voting on the ratification of the Constitution
(as well as other questions) each delegate shall have one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a delegate or delegates from two-thirds of the states, and a
majority of all the delegates shall be necessary to decision; and until ratified by the
people of the United States and the people of the requisite number of other nations, the
World Constitution will have no legal effect or validity in the United States. Reprinted
in 20 TEx. L. Rev. 536-39 (December, 1948).
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The electors are to be paid $100 for their services, and the delegates are to
47
be paid $5000 each for their attendance at the constituent assembly.
The question may be raised as to whether the legislature has the power
to appoint delegates without referring the question to the people, previously.
If this procedure is followed, then the resulting constitution would have to be
referred to the people for ratification or at the very least to a convention or
conventions elected by the people. This latter course was the procedure followed by our own Founding Fathers who were doubtful of their right even
to talk about a sovereign government's constitution, let alone try to ratify it
themselves.
Many of the delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 favored Patterson's New Jersey plan because of objections to Randolph's stronger plan, but
also because they were convinced that the Convention had no power to discuss
and propose such a radical departure from the Articles of Confederation.
Lansing of New York for example,
... was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was restrained
to amendments of a federal. nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being. . . . New York would never have concurred in sending
deputies to the Convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were
to turn on a consolidation of the states and a national government. 148
Patterson made the logical suggestion-but it was a suggestion which
was ignored by the bolder hearts who were guiding the convention. He
suggested, "Let us return to our states and obtain larger powers, not assume
them ourselves."
However, as we have seen, no one followed his suggestion, and the Constitution was successfully ratified anyhow! A very illegal thing, and one which
148
would doubtless fail today. a
But Patterson's suggestion points to an obvious out, and one for which
there are precedents, even in the United States, though his suggestion was one
which was more in accord with European experience. The suggestion is that
if we are really interested in getting world federation quickly, the wise thing
to do would be (1) make sure that delegates to a World Constituent Assemibly
are elected popularly and given as many instructions as are thought necessary;
and (2) then give them full authority to act for the people by whom they
have been elected, even to the extent of ratifying their own product. Of what
benefit is our earlier experience if we cannot learn from it. The legislatures
of the Thirteen States went into the Philadelphia Convention backwards. They'
147. Pennsylvania General Asseniby, Session of 1949, H. B. No. 968, introduced
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did not realize that they were about to be taken into a full-fledged national
government. Only Patrick Henry "smelt a Rat." If we want to join a world
federation, and want a world constitution, it might be simpler to empower
specially elected delegates to act as a national convention after they have participated in the drafting of a constitution, and vote on whether they like the
product of the joint efforts of the convention.
While every state but Delaware makes it a practice to ask the voters if
they want a constitutional convention, it is not a universal practice for
conventions to submit proposals to the people. Thus of 13 new constitutions
adopted from 1890 to 1912, only seven were submitted to the people. In five
states, there was no submission to the people (Mississippi, 1890; South
Carolina, 1895; Louisiana, 1898; Delaware, 1897; and Virginia, 1902). In
Kentucky in 1902 the convention met and altered the constitution after the
people had approved it. Promulgation of the Virginia Constitution of 1902
without submission to the voters occurred notwithstanding the fact that the
legislature in calling the convention had directed such submission. 1 9
The Pennsylvania Constitutions of 1776 and 1790 were never submitted
to the people for approval, although the legislature suggested that the convention of 1789-1790 adjourn for four months before formally proclaiming
the new constitution. This they did. The proposal was ostensibly to enable the
people to examine and discuss the draft. 5 0
During the first eight years of national independence, constitutions were
established by diverse procedures. In three states, constitutions were
provided by legislative bodies, without express authorization ind without
submission to the "people" (that is, the then existing electorate). In five
states, constitutions were drafted by legislative bodies expressly authorized
to perform this function, but were not submitted to the electorate,' 5'
The first convention held in the State of New York, in 1777, was a truly
revolutionary government. While it functioned, it exercised all the powers of
government. The constitution which it drafted went into effect at once, without popular ratification, but this of course, ought to be distinguished from
a constitution drafted by a convention expressly authorized by the electorate
of each nation.
Alabama was required by the enabling act of Congress to hold a convention to frame a government on behalf of the people, but there was no requirement in the enabling act that it be submitted for approval to the people. The
convention was elected by white male citizens. The Alabama Constitution of
1865 was put in force by a constitutional convention without submission to

149.
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the people. The Alabama Constitution of 1901 was apparently not submitted
to the electorate.
The conventions in the states to ratify the Federal Constitution-or to
disapprove it-had full power to act, No proposal was ever made in the
Convention or in any of the state conventions to submit the Constitution
directly to the electorate.1 2 This was considered a normal mode of procedure.'"3
The fundamental question which is being raised in this discussion is of
course whether the convention itself is sovereign, and if so, under what circumstances. One circumstance under which the convention would undoubtedly
be sovereign is the grant of powers expressly by whatever legislative act
established it and provided for the election of delegates. It is unlikely that
any convention is sovereign in the sense that it represents the people perfectly
or fully, despite the grandiloquent assertions to that effect made by members
154
of constitutional conventions.
However, there have been in our state constitutional histories many
instances in which the conventions have asserted sovereignty to the extent of
promulgating constitutions that they themselves have drawn up under authority
of the people. For example, while the New Jersey constitution of 1776 made
no provision for amendment by constitutional convention, such a convention
was organized in 1844, and ratified by popular vote, the very opposite
procedure of that used in establishing the constitution of 1776. In the 1776
constitution, the convention was elected by counties, drafted a constitution,
which went into effect forthwith without being submitted to the people. 155
Among constitutions established by conventions, presently in effect, the
following were not submitted to a ratifying vote by the people: Delaware, 1897;
Louisiana, 1921; South Carolina, 1895; Vermont, 1793; Virginia, 1902.1"
The Indiana constitution of 1816 was formed by a convention authorized
by the Enabling Act of the Fourteenth Congress to be elected by the adult
males. This convention was given the right, by the enabling act to decide
whether it was opportune to form a constitution and if so they were "authorized
to form a constitution and State government." No provision was made for
57
submission to the people'
The Florida constitution of 1883 was not submitted by the convention
which drafted it to the people. The preamble of that constitution begins, "We,
152. BORGEAUD, AnoPTION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE AND
ANtKRICA 132 (1895).
153. TIEr FEDERALIST, Nos. 39, 40, 49, 50 (Hamilton).
154. Jameson, op. cit., pp. 303-304. One delegate in the Illinois Convention of 1847
said, "He had and would continue against any and every proposition which would recognize
aty restrictions of the powers of this Convention. We are . . . the sovereignty of the
State. We are what the people of the State would be if they were congregated here in one
nass meeting ...."Illinois State Register (June, 1847).
155. 4 THoRPE, op. cit. supra at p. 2594.
156. Council of State Governments, BoOKc oF THE STATES 72 ff.(1945-46).
157, 2 TioRr., op, cit. supra at 1055, 1057.
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the people of the Territory of Florida, by our delegates in convention assembled
18
•. do mutually agree to form ourselves into a State Government .... ..
It does not appear that the people of Iowa ever had an opportunity to
give final approval to their 1846 Constitution, despite the beginning words in
its preamble, "We, the people of the Territory of Iowa . . . do ordain and
establish, etc ... ."; and the act admitting the state to the Union only alleged,
that "the people of the Territory of Iowa did, by a convention of delegates
called and assembled for that purpose, form for themselves a constitution
" Similarly, it would seem that the Iowa constitution
and government.
of 1857 was not submitted to the people for final ratification. 1"9
Later enabling acts of Congress provided for popular election of
delegates to state conventions and formation of constitutions "subject to the
approval and ratification of the people. .. 1.0
While previous constitutions of th State of Mississippi had been submitted to the vote of the people, 161 the constitutional convention of 1890 framed
a constitution in which the rights of Negroes politically were restricted, and
this was not submitted to the people for final ratification, notwithstanding
the formal provisions of the law. It was a coup d'etat. Nevertheless, the preamble of this 1890 Constitution stated, "We, the people of Mississippi, in cbnvention assembled . . . do ordain and establish, etc .... "
The first session of the '16th Congress passed an enabling act for the
State of Missouri giving the right to "free white males" to elect representatives
"to form a convention who have power to form a constitution and government
for the people. . ." Submission to the electorate was not mentioned. The
convention took it upon itself to accept further conditions imposed by Congress
for the admission of the state to the Union "for and in behalf of the people...
and by the authority of the people." i68 Several amendments to this constitution of 1820 were adopted prior to, and in, 1861, by the electorate after being
proposed by the legislature in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of 1820. But several other amendments in 1861 and up until 1863 were
framed by a state convention which met February 28, 1861, and was in session
irregularly until 1863. There was no authorization in the constitution of 1820
for such a constitutional convention, and the acts of this convention were
submitted to a vote of the people.' 64
The revolutionary conventions of New Hampshire, New Jersey and New
York were popularly elected and authorized to form a government, according
to the instructions or suggestions of the Continental Congress, and uid not
158. Id. at 664.
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submit their work to the people. But the constitutional convention of New
York, elected by the people in 1801, long after the unsettled conditions of
the American Revolution had become history, proposed and put into force
amndinents without submitting them to the people. 165

The conclusion seems inescapable therefore that constitutional conventions have the power to form and establish governments, if they are popularly
elected, whether or not they have a mandate from the people to exercise
that power. 16
At the same time, it is recognized by several court cases that the people
do have the right to put limitations on conventions, presumably by the
technique of approving by referendum of popular vote any limitations which
are written into the convention enabling act of the legislatures. 16 7 There seems
to be no judicial authority to deny that the people can restrict the convention
in advance. 16 In practice, of course, this power to restrict conventions is
limited to the restrictions imposed by the act of the legislature itself, since
submission of the enabling act to the people gives them only the choice of
accepting those restrictions proposed or giving up having any convention at
all. The people may of course instruct their delegates and thus control a
convention, but as a practical matter, this is largely a moral problem for
the individual delegate. "A delegate who desires to represent his constituents
can find many ways of sounding them on their views; perhaps the simplest
way being to declare his own platform in advance of his election, and let the
people elect or reject him on that basis.. ,, 169
In view of the numerous precedents cited above in our own history of the
powers of constitutional conventions to institute government of their own
motion, a current proposal in a preliminary draft of a world constitution assumes new interest. It provides for popular election of delegates to a world
constitutional convention and for ratificatory action on the constitution or a
constitution by those delegates acting as representatives of the people who have
elected them.
4. The Federal Convention shall consist of delegates elected directly by
the people of all states and nations, one delegate for each million of population or fraction thereof above one-half million, with the proviso that the
people of any extant state, recognized as sovereign in 1945, and ranging
between 100,000 and 1,000,000. shall be entitled to elect one delegate, but
any such state with a population below 100,000 shall be aggregated for
federal electoral purposes to the electoral unit closest to its borders.
165. 5 TotORpp.op. cit. supra at 2451, 2594, 2638.
166. Kamper v. Hawkins, I Va. Cas. 205 (1793); Cox v. Robisoi, 105 Tex. 426,
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The delegates to the Federal Convention shall vote as individuals, not as
members of national or otherwise collective representations (except as
specified hereinafter).
47. The Founding Convention having discussed and approved by individual majority vote this Constitution, ratification by collective majorities
within as many delegations of states and nations as represent two-thirds of
the population of the earth, shall be sufficient for the establishment of the
Federal Republic of the World.1 70
It should be noted that the phrase "elected directly by the people" has been
qualified to mean that "Each state would determine by its own laws or customs the method by which it would choose delegates to a federal convention,
the number of delegates being proportioned to its population." 171 It should
be further noted that since the federal constitutional convention itself is not
intended by the terms of this particular draft constitution to be part of the
government of the world itself, choosing delegates to this convention on the
basis of population does not determine or offer a solution to the problem of
representation in the world legislative body. That problem is dealt with by
172
another tour de force in this proposed constitution.
In discussing this method of establishing a constitution and government
for the world, G. A. Borgese, one of its chief architects explained the desirability of its consideration:
There can be tentative competing plans for world government

....

These

plans must be studied and presented to public opinion long before any convention is called, so that the convention will find before it a plan which makes
sense--one which is organic and articulated. At that moment, before the
calling of that convention, pressure will be exercised on the governments,
on the powers which be, to make the convention a founding and sovereign
one, which can approve a constitution, which can choose one of those which
have been proposed and amend it.
This constitution then can either be immediately ratified by the convention, or at most, be submitted to speedy plebiscites. I am in favor of this
course, short of which only if it fails we can think of detours.
(In answering the question, "Why do you think it has to be an official convention, sanctioned by the governments ?" he replied) :
Because only an official convention can have the power of approving
and ratifying a constitution; and an unofficial convention can have only the
job of proposing it to public opinion, to governments, to parliaments. Then,
this quest for single ratifications may take a tremendous amount -of time
and may bump against deadlocks and conflicts which are insuperable It is
one assembly which must have this power even though followed possibly
by speedy plebiscites. l a
170. CoMMIrE
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There have been several proposals in this country to deal with the
extremely relevant problem of the election of delegates to such a world constitutional convention. It is this writer's opinion that any proposal adopted
should meet the qualifications imposed on constitutional conventions in our
past experience as a nation and as states. In the first place, the "people" must
be represented. Here is meant "the aggregate or mass of people who constitute
the state." 174 But as a practical matter, the people must be represented by
"those persons who are permitted by the constitution of the State to exercise
the elective franchise." 175
When the.term the people is made use of in constitutional law or discussions, it is often the case that those only are intended who have a share in
the government through being clothed with the elective franchise. Thus the
people elect delegates to a constitutional convention .... For these and similar
purposes, the electors, though constituting but a small minority of the whole
body of the community, nevertheless act for all, and, as being for the time the
representatives of sovereignty, they are considered and spoken of as the
sovereign people.176
Any attempt of the excluded classes of people to assert their right to a
share in the government, otherwise than by operating on the public opinion
of those who possess the right of suffrage, would be regarded as an attempt
at revolution, and any attempt by those who possess the right of suffrage to
exercise their right to participate in the election of delegates to a world constitutional convention in a manner not prescribed or pointed out by Aatute
177
would not be of legal force.
With these preliminary considerations in mind, we may consider some
of the extant proposals for electing delegates to a world constitutional convention. The Tennessee legislation provides for election of delegates by qualified
voters from the state at large, there being only three to be elected, according to
178
the scheme of representation of one delegate per million or fraction thereof.
The Pennsylvania legislative proposal provides for popular election of one
"elector of delegates" from each of the 50 genatorial districts in the State of
Pennsylvania, these electors to select from their midst in Assembly convened
ten delegates from Pennsylvania to join the national delegation to the World
Constituent Assembly.1 7 9 The New York proposal provided merely for a
referendum. among the qualified voters of the state on the advisabilify of the
people of the United States taking the initiative in calling a world convention.
ROUND TABLE 7-8. (1947) ; See also Borgese, Founding Convention: When? How? and
Vhere? 1 COMMON CAUSE 41-43 (1947).
174. Solon v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R., 114 S. W. 349 (1908).
175 COOLEY, I CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 81 (1927 ed.).
176. II Bouvta's LAw DIcTiONARY 2557 (1914).
177. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849). See also COOLEY, loc. cit.
178. See note 141 supra.
179. See note 142 supra.
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Its sponsor intended that delegates might be either elected or appointed by the
legislature of the State. 80 Robert M. Hutchins in a radio broadcast, April 4,
1948, said simply, "All Americans... should call upon the President and upon
Congress to initiate a world constitutional convention." 181 No other proposals
for elections by the people of the United States to a world constituent assembly
have come to the attention of the writer.
Each of the three proposals involving state action mentioned above
contemplates sending delegates to a World Constituent Assembly to be held in
Geneva, Switzerland, in 1950. The originator of this date and place was
the British Member of Parliament, Henry Usborne. The confusing thing
about this assembly, as conceived in the mind of Usborne and indeed of every
exponent of its desirability, is that it is to be "unofficial." 182 Not that he
proposes to establish world government without the consent of the governments involved. Far from it. He, and others, intend that the convention should
merely propose d world constitution to the governments of the world, and
then adjourn. Far from being a revolutiorary body, this world constituent
assembly is conceived as being the same sort of purely informal gathering to
draft a tentative proposal as our Founding Fathers considered the Philadelphia
convention:
It is urged that this is not such a system as was within the powers of
the Convention; they assumed the power of proposing. I believe they might
have made proposals without going beyond their powers. . .'. The fact is,
they have exercised no power at all, and in point of validity, this Constitution, proposed by them for the government of the United States, claims no
more than a production of the same nature would claim, flowing from a
private pen. It is laid before the citizens of the United States, unfettered by
restraint; it is laid before them to be judged by the natural, civil, and political
rights of man. By their fiat it will become of value and authority; without
it, it will never receive the character of authenticity. 83
But if the World Constituent Assembly is merely to be an "unofficial"
gathering, why bother to go to the trouble and expense of electing delegates
to it? Any group of persons could draft a constitution, and a group of ten or
twelve could do a better job than a mob of 2,000 or more delegates from all
over the world. And if such a constitution is to be submitted to the nations and
the people of the world for their approval afterwards, why bother to insure
popular representation beforehand? These are questions which cannot be
satisfactorily answered-from a legal point of view-by the proponents of
the "unofficial" constitutional convention. The answers they give are the
answers of the public relations man or of the educator:
180.
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It would doubtless be good publicity and help the cause to have
prominent citizens of many nations meet and pass resolutions about world
government. That, however, is a different thing from achieving anything of
a binding nature. 184
I do feel that a World Constituent Assembly would have considerable
publicity and educational value. 185
In particular, I see considerable valuq in the Peoples' Convention
approach-so long as it is clear that this approach is a method of promoting
the idea of world government rather than achieving it. To the extent that it
can mobilize public opinion behind the idea of world government, to the
extent that it can furnish working blueprints for a proposed world government, it can have great value.
But I do not see the Peoples' Convention idea--or any idea going
outside established governments-as the sole, or even most effective,
practical approach. It [the peoples' convention idea] involves not ratification but petition.' 86
If public opinion is aroused to the point of demanding world government, public officials will respond; if public opinion18is7 not so aroused, no
unofficial group can do more than debate and exhort.
Such an assembly may have tremendous educational value if it is
understood to be completely unofficial and for purposes of illustration. It
would seem that if our government were willing to ratify the product of
such an unofficial body it would be willing to be part of an official body.1 88
As a matter of fact, both the Tennessee legislation and the Pennsylvania
proposal mentioned above assume the convention would be unofficial and provide for the referral to the United States of any constitution drafted, so that
it might be ratified by an American constitutional convention, in accord with
the provisions of Article V of the United States Constitution.
For those who have had enough of publicity stunts and world citizens
without world government, another unofficial proposal would be anathema.
There have been since the war any number of "informal and unauthorized
propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of
citizens." What is wanted now is some quick and easy device which would
enable an official proposal to be made and ratified in an orderly manner.
The best way to do this would be to insert an enabling clause in the state
delegate-election legislation authorizing the delegates to the convention to form
a national ratifying convention immediately upon the adjournment of the
drafting convention. But even if this clause were not inserted, there seems to be
a preponderance of authority to the effect that legislatures cannot bind constitu184. Letter from Cass Canfield, Chairman of the Board, Harper & Brothers, April
6, 1948.
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187. Letter from Mildred Riorden Blake, Young and Rubicam, Inc., and member
of Executive Board, United World Federalists, April 5, 1948.
188. Letter from Laurence Dawson, expressing views of Edison Dick, president
of A. B. Dick and Co., Chicago, 3 May 1948.

tional conventions in the functions which are considered appropriate to them,1'9
and there have been many instances of constitutional conventions which have
specified the mode by which ratification of the constitutions drafted should be
accomplished. If this is so, then we may conclude that even an "unofficial"
constitutional convention to which delegates were regularly elected by vote
of the people might use its delegated sovereignty to ratify, on behalf of their
own people and the people of the world, a constitution and establish a world
federation. And this, presumably, would be true for the United States no
matter what the procedure for selection of delegates may be in other countries
of the world. If all the henchmen of the Kremlin's men swarmed about the
assembly hall and railroaded a communist constitution through the convention,
the American delegates would still be as free as ever to refuse their assent to it.
189. Reasoning by analogy, if the national congress were to appoint members of
Congress to act as delegates, without first securing popular consent, such a delegation
would not or could not be legally bound by any legislative instructions. "In such a case
the General Assembly is held to have summoned the people to sit, by their delegates,
in convention untrammeled by rules or restraints of any kind that will interfere with the
performance of its proper functions." In re opinion to the Governor, 55 R. I. 56, 178 At.
433 at pp. 452-453 (1935).
On the other hand, if election by the electorate of delegates to a world constitutional
convention were authorized by state legislatures and if the act specified the scope of the
convention and the manner in which it would conduct its deliberations and this were
approved by regular popular vote, then a convention called in this manner would be
bound to confine itself within stated limits.
One useful function the national congress might perform is to co-ordinate and
harmonize state legislation providing for the election of delegates. Congress has the
power without resorting to Constitutional amendment, to regulate the election of Representatives and Senators. Why not other national delegates as well?
One useful function the United Nations might perform on the next higher level
is to co-otdinate and harmonize the procedures of national states to the end that the
founding convention when finally met would have authority to proceed with dispatch.
Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W. Va.
Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 33 S. E.2d 49 (1945)
613, 708 (1873) : "A constitutional convention lawfully convened does not derive its
powers from the legislature but from the people." See also HOAlt, op. cit., 52: "All
conventions are valid if called by the people speaking through the electorate at a regular
election. . . . Their validity rests not upon constitutional provision nor upon legislative
act, but upon the fundamental sovereignty of the people themselves." See also Dodd,
Constitutional Limitations (1910 ed.) 92: "As a rule, then, constitutional conventions are
subject only to the following restrictions: (1) those contained in or implied from provisions in the existing state and federal constitutions, the United Nations Charter? it is
certainly not superior in law to anything, and (2) in the absence of constitutional provisions, those derived or implied from the limited functions of conventions. To these restrictions, Jameson and others would add those imposed by legislative acts under which
conventions are called, but such restrictions are certainly not yet recognized as of absolute
binding force, except in Pennsylvania, and should not be so recognized if the convention is
to be an instrument of great usefulness." Carton v. Secretary of State, 151 Mich. 337
(1908) : "By necessary implication the legislature is prohibited from any control over the
method of revising the Constitution. The convention is an independent and sovereign body
whose sole power and duty are to prepare and submit to the people a revision of the
constitution or a new Constitution to take its place." Accord, News Corp. v. Smith, 353
Mo. 845, 184 S. W.2d 598 (1945).

